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Mental States as Emergent Properties
From Walking to Consciousness
Holk Cruse & Malte Schilling
In this article we propose a bottom-up approach to higher-level mental states,
such as emotions, attention, intention, volition, or consciousness. The idea behind
this bottom-up approach is that higher-level properties may arise as emergent
properties, i.e., occur without requiring explicit implementation of the phenomenon
under  examination.  Using  a  neural  architecture  that  shows  the  abilities  of
autonomous agents, we want to come up with quantitative hypotheses concerning
cognitive mechanisms, i.e., to come up with testable predictions concerning the
underlying structure and functioning of an autonomous system that can be tested
in a robot-control system. 
We do not want to build an artificial system that is, for example, conscious
in the first place. On the contrary, we want to construct a system able to control
behavior. Only then will this system be used as a tool to test to what extent de-
scriptions of mental phenomena used in psychology or philosophy of mind may be
applied to such an artificial system. Originally these phenomena are necessarily
defined using verbal formulations that allow for interpreting them differently. A
functional definition, in contrast, does not suffer from being ambiguous, because it
can be expressed explicitly using mathematical formulations that can be tested,
for example, in a quantitative simulation. It is important to note that we are not
concerned with the “hard” problem of consciousness, i.e., the subjective aspect of
mental phenomena. This approach is possible because, adopting a monist view, we
assume that we can circumvent the “hard” problem without losing information con-
cerning the possible function of these phenomena. In other words, we assume that
phenomenality is an inherent property of both access consciousness and metacog-
nition (or reflexive consciousness). Following these arguments, we claim that our
network does not only show emergent properties on the reactive level; it  also
shows that mental states, such as emotions, attention, intention, volition, or con-
sciousness can be observed, too. Concerning consciousness, we argue that proper-
ties assumed to partially constitute access consciousness are present in our net-
work, including the property of global availability, which means that elements of
the procedural memory can be addressed even if they do not belong to the current
context. Further expansions are discussed that may allow for the recognition of
properties attributed to metacognition or reflexive consciousness. 
Keywords
Access  consciousness |  Consciousness |  Emergent  properties |  Internal  body
model |  Minimal cognitive  system |  Motor  control |  ReaCog |  Recurrent neural

























In this article we propose a bottom-up approach
to higher-level  mental  states,  such as,  for  ex-
ample,  consciousness.  In  contrast  to  most  re-
lated approaches, we do not take consciousness
as  our  point  of  departure,  but  rather  aim,
firstly,  to  construct  a  system  that  has  basic
properties  of  a  reactive  system.  In  a  second
step, this system will be expanded and will gain
cognitive properties in the sense of being able to
plan ahead. Only after this work is finished, we
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ask to what extent this system is equipped with
higher-level properties as for example emotions
or consciousness. While other approaches would
require an exact definition of, for example, con-
sciousness, in our case we do not have to start
from a clear-cut definition and try to fit it into
a model.  We follow this  alternative route be-
cause there are no generally accepted definitions
concerning  these  higher-level  phenomena.  In
this way we hope to identify the essential ele-
ments required to instantiate, for example, con-
sciousness.
The  idea  behind  this  approach  is  that
higher-level  properties  may  arise  as  emergent
properties, i.e., may occur without requiring ex-
plicit implementation of the phenomenon under
examination but instead arise from the coopera-
tion of lower-level elements. Some authors dis-
tinguish  between  “strong”  emergence  and
“weak”  emergence  (e.g.,  Laughlin &  Pines
2000).  Strong  emergence  means  that  there  is
principally  no  way  to  explain  the  emergent
property by known properties of the elements of
the  system  and  their  coupling.  Here  we  are
dealing  with  weak  emergence.  In  this  case,  a
property recognized when looking at the whole
system can at first glance not be traced back
(or perhaps only partially) to known properties
of the elements and their couplings. Often, aux-
iliary  assumptions  are  made  to  explain  this
property as a global property, i.e., as a property
ascribed to the system as a whole. A more de-
tailed inspection may, however, show that such
auxiliary assumptions are not required. Instead,
the emergent property follows from the proper-
ties  of  the elements and the  specific  ways  in
which they causally interact. This insight allows
for an understanding of an emergent property
in the sense that this property can be predicted,
although we may not understand why it arises,
and that one is able to construct a new system
showing this property.
Following  this  approach,  one  crucial  de-
cision to be made at the beginning concerns the
granularity of the lower-level elements. In our
approach, we start from a behavioral perspect-
ive and focus on the nervous system as central
to the control of action. Therefore, we use neur-
onal units as the basic elements for our model-
ing and for the analysis. Specifically, we use ar-
tificial neural network units with analogue ac-
tivation  values  and  dynamic  (low-pass  filter)
properties1.  That  is,  our  neural  elements  are
qualitatively comparable with non-spiking neur-
ons.  Although  there  are  arguments  that  con-
sciousness, in order to arise, might require syn-
chronously  oscillating  spikes  (Singer &  Gray
1995), we claim that the level applied here is
general enough to allow for an understanding of
such  mental  processes.  As  a  side  effect,  this
level of abstraction covers different evolutionary
groups, such as those represented by insects and
mammals,  for  example.  Though  much  of  our
discussion, below, focuses on the example of in-
sects, we do not want to argue that insects have
all the higher-level properties addressed later in
this article, but only that they share the same
fundamental  functions  used  in  motor  control
and have, on that level, a comparable structure.
Using  these  simple  neural  elements,  we
start by implementing very basic faculties that
include  the  ability  to  move  one’s  own
1 A low-pass filter is qualitatively characterized by an increase of out-
put activation that, when excited by a constant stimulus, asymptot-
ically approaches a given output value.
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Figure 1: Arrangement of the leg-controllers (boxes: FL
front left, ML middle left, HL hind left, FR front right,
MR middle right, HL hind right) of the hexapod walker.
The arrows show coordinating influences (1–4) that act
between neighbouring leg-controllers.
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(non-trivial2)  body,  and  allow  for  orientation
and navigation in an only partially known en-
vironment. To this end we use a body with six,
insect-like legs. This means that we deal with at
least eighteen active degrees of freedom (DoF)
and not two—as is  the case for many robots
that  are  restricted  to  moving  around  on  a
two-dimensional  plane.  This  means  that  the
controller has to deal with a large number of re-
dundant DoFs. To control the behavior of the
robot we use a reactive and embodied neuronal
controller, as it is available from earlier work on
insect behavior (Schilling et al. 2013a). Later, a
minor expansion of the network will allow for
cognitive faculties.
What  are  the  properties  of  the
reactive/cognitive system considered here? The
reactive  system is  called  “Walknet”  and it  is
based  on  biological  insights  from experiments
2 I.e., a body with redundant degrees of freedom arranged in both par-
allel and serial order.
on the walking behavior of stick insects (Dürr
et al. 2004; Bläsing 2006; Schilling et al. 2013b).
As will be explained in section 2, Walknet was
set up as a system for controlling the walking
behavior of a six-legged system in an unpredict-
able environment, e.g., on cluttered terrain or
climbing  over  large  gaps—which,  when  per-
formed in a realistic, natural environment is a
non-trivial  task. Already on this level we can
observe  emergent  properties.  The  number  of
legs on the ground differs depending on the ve-
locity of  the walker  (for  slower walking more
legs are on the ground). As a consequence the
phase relations between different legs differ de-
pending on the velocity of the walker. Import-
antly, the resulting stepping patterns (“gaits”)
are not  explicitly encoded in the control  net-
work, but are a result of the interaction of the
control network with the environment as medi-
ated through the body (1st order embodiment
Metzinger 2014). In a further step, the reactive
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Figure 2: The network controlling the reactive system. Motivation units (red) form an RNN that can assume various
attractor states (only two leg-controllers are shown). Arrows show excitatory influences, T-shaped connections show in-
hibitory influences (fw forward, bw backward, r1 coordination rule 1) The motivation units at the lower margin control
procedures (boxes, e.g., swing, stance). The procedures include the internal body model (blue). The body is marked by
dashed boxes (“leg”). Indicated here is the network Navinet that controls walking direction (see figure 4 for more de-
tails).
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controller is expanded to be able to deal with
navigation  tasks.  This  additional  network,
called “Navinet”, is able to simulate a number
of experimental results observed in desert ants
and honeybees, such as the capability of finding
food sources using path integration and orienta-
tion with respect to visual landmarks. 
Both networks are characterized by their
decentralized nature. These networks consist of
procedural,  (reactive)  elements,  namely  small
neural networks that in general connect sensory
input with motor output, thereby forming the
procedural  memory.  Inspired  by (Maes 1991),
these  procedural  elements  are  coupled  via  a
“motivation unit  network”, a recurrent neural
network (RNN) that forms the backbone of the
complete system. This type of architecture has
been  termed  MUBCA  (for  Motivation  Unit
Based  Columnar  Architecture  (MUBCA),
Schilling et al. 2013b). The motivation unit net-
work allows for selection of different behaviors
by  adopting  different  attractor  states,  where
each attractor represents a group of motivation
units being activated, which in turn control the
procedural elements. As the different groups do
in  part  overlap,  albeit  in  different  ways,  the
network allows for the representation of a heter-
archical  structure (e.g.,  see left  upper part  of
figure 2). 
As a next “evolutionary” step, this react-
ive network will be expanded to be able to em-
brace cognitive properties (sects. 3 and 6). The
notion of cognition is often used in a broad and
sometimes unspecific way. In the following we
will rely on the definition given by  McFarland
&  Bösser (1993) who assume that  a cognitive
system  is  characterized  by  the  capability  of
planning ahead. We prefer this clear-cut defini-
tion  of  cognition  compared  to  many  others
found in the literature, as the latter are gener-
ally  quite  weak  (in  extreme  cases  cognitive
properties  are  even  attributed  to  bacteria,
which, in our view, would make the term cogni-
tion meaningless). While such a specific defini-
tion might seem too narrow, in our understand-
ing it captures the essence of cognition. Focus-
ing on planning ahead being realized by mental
simulation (Hesslow 2002) allows extending this
notion  of  cognition  to  easily  include  other
high-level phenomena, while still relying on the
same internal mechanism. Therefore, in this art-
icle, apart from section 10.3 (Metacognition) we
will use the term cognition in the strict sense as
proposed by McFarland & Bösser (1993). 
Being able to plan ahead implies the cap-
ability of being able to internally simulate beha-
vior, which basically means to be able to simu-
late  movements  of  one’s  own  body  within  a
given environment. This faculty requires, as a
first step, the availability of a flexible, “manip-
ulable” internal body-model. Planning ahead is
interesting in a situation where the actually car-
ried out reactive behavior cannot reach the cur-
rently pending goal. Therefore, a further expan-
sion is required that allows for the invention of
new  behaviors.  Together  with  the  faculty  of
planning  ahead,  the  system  can  then  test
newly-invented behaviors  by applying internal
simulation (“internal  trial-and-error”)  in  order
to find a solution for novel problems for which
no solution is currently known to the system.3
This system, called “reaCog”, represents a
basic version of a cognitive system in the strict
sense intended by McFarland & Bösser (1993).
As such, cognitive expansion does not function
by itself, but only, like a parasite, on top of the
reactive structures—a view that has been sup-
ported  for  a  long  time  (Norman &  Shallice
1986). The cognitive system depends on its re-
active  basis  (therefore  it  is  called  reaCog).
Therefore,  the  evolution  of  cognitive  abilities
crucially  requires  a  correspondingly  rich  (pro-
cedural) memory.
In  order  to  increase  the  richness  of  the
memory of the complete system, in section 5 we
introduce perceptual memory and complete the
system by implementing “Word-nets”, a specific
form of procedural and perceptual memory. In
this way, the whole system is equipped with as-
pects of semantic memory, and can be claimed
to represent a minimal cognitive system. We do
not  deal  with  learning  but  only  discuss  the
properties of the finished network. The learning
3 Note that the term simulation is used here in two different ways.
“Internal simulation” enables the agent to simulate behaviors intern-
ally, i.e. without actually performing them in reality. Simulation of
an  animal  addresses  the  construction  of  an  artificial  agent.  The
agent may take the form of a software simulation or a hardware sim-
ulation (i.e., a physical robot).
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of  some  aspects  has,  however,  been  treated
earlier (Hoinville et al. 2012; Cruse & Schilling
2010a).
After having introduced reaCog in sections
2–6, we will, in sections 7–11, discuss how more
abstract functions, such as those described in,
e.g.,  psychology,  can  be  based  on  such  a
simply-structured network.
A fundamental problem when aiming for
an understanding of  phenomena like emotions
or  consciousness  concerns  the  phenomenal  as-
pect. The phenomenal aspect, often character-
ized  as  the  hard  problem  (Chalmers 1997),
refers  to  the  strange,  unexplainable  phe-
nomenon that physical systems, in our case rep-
resented by specific dynamics of neuronal struc-
tures, can be accompanied by subjective experi-
ence.  Basic  examples  are experiencing pain,  a
color, or the internal state of an emotion (e.g.,
joy, fear). In section 7 we discuss this aspect in
some detail and postulate that phenomenality is
an  emergent  property.  As  mentioned,  we  are
not  aiming  to  solve  the  “hard”  problem
(Chalmers 1997), but we argue that it is suffi-
cient to concentrate on the functional aspect.
In particular, we focus on the phenomena
of emotions and consciousness. According to a
number of authors (e.g.,  Valdez & Mehrabian
1994),  these  are  assumed  to  be  an  inherent
property  for  some  cognitive  systems.  There-
fore,  although we do not want to state that
emotions  (section  8),  attention,  volition,  in-
tention (section 9), and consciousness (section
10)  should  necessarily  be  attributed  to  our
system in  any  sense,  we  want  to  discuss  to
what extent properties characterized by differ-
ent  levels  of  description  can  be  observed  in
our model. 
Considering emotions, these are defined on
different levels in the literature, so that there is
no clear, generally accepted distinction between
concepts  like  emotions,  moods,  motivations,
drives, etc., which appear to form a continuum
of  overlapping,  not  clearly  separable  concepts
(Pérez et  al. 2012).  Focusing  on  selected  ex-
amples,  in  section  8 we  will  show how these
phenomena may be attributed to our system,
for example by referring to basic  emotions as
proposed by Ekman (1999).
Concerning consciousness, as discussed by
Cleeremans (2005), this phenomenon should be
approached by differentiating different aspects
and treating those aspects separately. To this
end, following  Block (1995,  2001),  Cleeremans
(2005), introduces a distinction between access
consciousness,  metacognition,  and  phenomenal
consciousness.  In  sections  10.1 (access  con-
sciousness) and 10.3 (metacognition) we will fo-
cus on whether and how the presented model
can be related to the different aspects that are
described by Cleeremans (2005), such as access
consciousness  and  metacognition.  From  our
point  of  view  the  simple  control  structure
presented does fulfill some aspects of both ac-
cess consciousness and metacognition. We shall
finish with discussion and conclusion in  sects.
11, 12.4
2 Walknet 
ReaCog  is  an  expansion  of  a  control  system
that has been realized as a neural network. The
underlying  system  has  been  termed  Walknet.
Walknet is biologically inspired and is supposed
to describe the results of many behavioral stud-
ies  on  the  walking  behavior  of  stick  insects
(Dürr et al. 2004;  Schilling et al. 2013b). We
will briefly sketch the properties of the network
as far as is required for understanding the basic
abilities considered here.
Overall,  the  controller  has  to  deal  with
the difficult task of coordinating multiple de-
grees  of  freedom; in the case of  the hexapod
walker the body consists  of  twenty-two DoF.
There are three DoF for each of the six legs
and  an  additional  four  DoF  are  present  in
between the body segments. The system is re-
dundant, as only six DoFs are needed to define
a position and orientation in three-dimensional
space. The controller therefore has to to deal
with sixteen  extra DoFs.  The architecture of
the Walknet  controller  is  decentral.  Each leg
has an individual and more or less independent
controller that decides which action to choose
(two such leg-controllers are shown in figure 2,
the black boxes in the lower part). A single leg
4 This  article  comprises  an  essential  extension  of  an  earlier  paper
(Cruse & Schilling 2013).
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controller consists of several procedures. In the
figure, each procedure is represented as a single
black box. In the basic system, the two import-
ant behaviors a leg can perform are the swing
and stance  movement.  The procedures  them-
selves are realized as artificial RNN. Examples
are the two basic procedures: the “Swing-net”,
which controls  the swing movement,  and the
“Stance-net”, which controls the stance move-
ment of the leg. Only two of the six leg-con-
trollers are shown. These networks constitute
the procedural memory of the system. The pro-
cedural  modules  receive  direct  sensory  input
and  provide  motor  control  commands  as  an
output.  But  there  are  also  modules  that
provide input to another module. The control-
ler on the leg level determines which procedure
should be actived at any given time, depending
on  the  current  state  of  the  leg  (swing  or
stance), as well as on sensory inputs (ground
contact,  position).  In  addition,  controllers  of
neighboring  legs  can  influence  each  other
through  a  small  number  of  connections
between those controllers. These influences are
explicitly derived from experiments on the co-
ordination  of  legs  in  walking  experiments  on
the stick insect. 
As  was found in  the insects,  during  the
swing movement (protraction) the legs aim to-
wards a position at the front, close to the posi-
tion of the anterior leg. Therefore, each leg pos-
sesses a so-called “target net” in order to pro-
duce these targeted movements. During forward
walking  the  so-called  “Target_fw-net”  is  re-
sponsible  for  this  targeting.  During  backward
walking “Target_bw-net” is used. Both directly
influence the Swing-net. Procedures marked as
blue boxes (“body model”, “leg model”) will be
explained below (section 3.1).
ReaCog is expanded by an RNN, which
consists of motivation units (figure 2, marked
in  red).  This  network  allows  the  system  to
autonomously select one of the different pos-
sible behaviors. For example, the system may
choose between forward or backward walking,
or standing. A motivation unit is an artificial
neuron  with  linear  summation  input  and
piecewise  linear  activation  function,  showing
output values from zero to one. Applied to a
procedure,  for  example  Swing-net,  a  motiva-
tion unit determines the strength of the out-
put of  the corresponding procedural  network
(in  a  multiplicative  way).  As  mentioned
above,  motivation  units  form  a  recurrent
neural network and can influence each other
through  excitatory  or  inhibitory  connections
(as shown in figure 2). 
In addition, there are sensory units that
are part of this RNN and that can directly in-
fluence the motivation units’ activation, e.g.,
as shown in figure 2 for the “lower-level” units
for  Swing  and  Stance.  There,  an  active
ground-contact sensor  of  a  leg reinforces  the
stance motivation unit for this leg. As the mo-
tivation  unit  network  can  be  arbitrarily  ex-
panded, it allows to control of complex beha-
viors. To illustrate a small group of behaviors
only,  units  as  “walk”,  “fw”  (forward),  “bw”
(backward), “leg1” are depicted (for more ex-
amples  see  Schilling et  al. 2013b;  Cruse &
Wehner 2011).
The network of  motivation and sensory
units does not have to form a simple, tree-like
structure  (see  figure  2).  It  can  constitute  a
heterarchy. Motivation units can be bi-direc-
tionally  connected  through  positive  (arrow-
heads) and negative (T-shaped heads) connec-
tions. As shown in the figure, this can lead to
cycles.  There  are  also  different  overlapping
subnetworks,  e.g.,  the “leg” units  as  well  as
the motivation unit for “walk” are active dur-
ing backward and forward walking. But only
one  unit  indicating  the  direction  of  walking
can be active at any given time, i.e. either the
unit  “fw”  or  “bw” can be active.  As  a  con-
sequence,  there  are  multiple  stable  attractor
states formed through the combinations of ex-
citatory  and  inhibitory  connections.  The
stable “internal states” stabilize the behavior
of  the  overall  control  system,  as  the  system
cannot be easily disturbed solely through in-
appropriate sensory inputs. For example, sens-
ory  inputs  are  treated  differently  depending
on the current state (swing or stance) of the
control system, and these internal states can
be differentiated  on  a  higher-level,  e.g.,  into
walking,  standing,  or  feeding (for details  see
Schilling et al. 2013a; Schilling et al. 2013b).
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Figure  3:  Step pattern  arising from the  decentralized
leg-controllers connected by local rules and the environ-
ment. Abscissa is time; black bars indicate swing move-
ment;  the  gaps  represent  stance  movement  of  this  leg
(from top to bottom: front left leg (FL), middle left leg
(ML), hind left leg (HL), correspondingly front right leg
(FR), middle right leg (MR) and hind right leg (HR) for
the right side). The lower bars indicate 500 iterations cor-
responding  to  5s  real  time.  These  “foot-fall  patterns”
show various locally or globally stable patterns depending
on walking velocity (a: slow, b: fast) and of starting posi-
tion. In (a) the legs start with an “uncomfortable” leg
configuration leading to a gallop-like pattern (indicated
by the vertical ellipses) that after about six steps changes
to  the  globally  stable  pattern,  typical  for  slow  insect
walking (see inclined ellipses, step # 8). (b) shows fast
walking leading to  a  tripod gait  characterized by syn-
chronous swing movements of ML, FR, HR and FL, HL,
MR (see vertical ellipses).
For an RNN, maintaining a stable state is
a non-trivial problem, in particular, when there
are various disturbances. To illustrate the ad-
aptability and at the same time the stability of
the  behavior  controlled  by such a  motivation
unit network, in figure 3 we show two cases of
hexapod walking. Figure  3a shows an example
of  a slow walking speed where the legs begin
from  a  difficult  starting  configuration  (both
front legs, both middle legs and both hind legs
start from the same position, which is opposite
to  the  coordination  found in  normal  walking,
where opposite legs alternate). Nonetheless, the
agent  is  able  to  walk.  After  some  steps,  the
agent reaches a temporally stable pattern cor-
responding to normal walking. Figure 3b shows
a  step  pattern  corresponding  to  high-speed
walking, often termed “tripod gait”.  Although
usually considered to be a regular pattern, de-
tailed inspection shows that there are local tem-
poral variations, but the overall pattern remains
stable (for videos of further walking examples
see  Schilling et al. 2013b). It  is  important to
note that none of these step-patterns are expli-
citly implemented, but arise as emergent prop-
erties (for details see Schilling et al. 2013a). As
another impressive emergent property,  Bläsing
(2006)  showed  that,  with  some  minor  exten-
sions,  this  walker  is  able  to  climb  over  large
obstacles  (which  can be  more  than twice  the
normal step-width).
3 Internal representation 
In addition to using the loop through the envir-
onment itself, some form of internalization is a
prerequisite for any kind of planning. Therefore,
specific  internal  representations5 are  necessary
for a cognitive system. This is well in line with
the embodied perspective, because from an evol-
utionary point of view internal models are not
at first disconnectable from a very specific func-
tion, and they work in service of a specific be-
havior (Glenberg 1997).  Internal models have,
in this sense, co-evolved with behavior (Steels
2003). An early representation is the representa-
tion of one’s own body, and such a representa-
tion  becomes  meaningful  early  on,  in  simple
control tasks like targeted movements or sensor
fusion.
3.1 Body model 
In reaCog we introduced an internal model of
the  body.  This  model  is  realized  as  an  RNN
(Schilling 2011)  and  has  a  modular  structure
(Schilling & Cruse 2007;  Schilling et al. 2012).
The  overall  model  consists  of  two  different
5 The term representation is used here in the broad sense of  Steels
(1995)  “physical  structures  (for  example  electro-chemical  states)
which have correlations with aspects of the environment”.
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levels. On the top level the whole body and the
structure of the insect are represented in an ab-
stract way. Only on the lower level are the de-
tails filled in. The lower level consists of six leg
networks.  Here,  for  each  leg  the  functional
structure of the joints and the limb is captured.
In this way this level of representation can be
used for motor control and provides detailed in-
formation  about  joint  movements.  On  the
higher level, the structure of the body and the
legs is represented in an abstract form, i.e., only
the footholds of the legs appear on this level.
Figure  2 shows the different parts of the body
model (drawn in blue). The body model is mod-
ular. It comprises a holistic system that is real-
ized as an RNN (figure  5,  see  Schilling 2011;
Schilling et al. 2012 for details).
The  body  model  is  used  during  normal
walking, meaning that the system is still in the
reactive mode, in forward as well as backward
walking or when negotiating curves. It coordin-
ates the movement of the joints and delivers the
appropriate control signals for the Stance-net-
works. As explained above, overall the system is
redundant, with twenty-two DoFs in the whole
body structure, and this makes deriving consist-
ent control signals for all the joints a difficult
problem that can’t  be computed directly,  but
rather requires application of additional criteria
(e.g.,  for  optimizing  energy  consumption).  In
our  approach,  which  uses  the  internal  body
model, we employ the passive motion paradigm
(von Kleist 1810; Mussa-Ivaldi et al. 1988; Loeb
2001). Consider the body model as a simulated
puppet of the body (figure 5) that is pulled by
its head in the direction of the goal (figure 5b,
pull_fw). This information on the target direc-
tion could be provided by sensory input, e.g.,
from the antennae or vision, in the form of a
target  vector  (figure  2,  sensory input).  When
pulled in this direction, the whole model should
take up this movement and therefore the indi-
vidual legs currently in stance should follow the
movement in an appropriate way. The induced
changes in the joints can be read out and ap-
plied  as motor commands in  order  to control
the real joints. In backward or curved walking,
the body model has only to be pulled into a cor-
responding direction (in backward walking us-
ing the vector attached to the back of the body
model, pull_bw (figure 5b). In this way we ob-
tain an easy solution to the inverse kinematic
problem as the body-model represents the kin-
ematical constraints of the body of the walker.
It restrains the possible movements of the indi-
vidual  joints  through  these  constraints,  and
only allows possible solutions for the legs stand-
ing on the ground, thereby providing coordin-
ated movements in all the involved joints.
The body-model is also connected to the
sensors of the walking system and integrates the
incoming  sensory  information  into  the  cur-
rently-assumed state of the body as represented
in the body-model. In this way the body-model
is able to correct noisy or incorrect sensory data
(Schilling & Cruse 2012). Overall, the main task
of the body model is pattern completion. It uses
the current state and incoming sensory data to
come up with the most likely state of the body
that fulfils  the encoded kinematic  constraints.
In this way, the model can also be used as a
forward-model,  meaning  that,  given  specific
joint configuration, the model can predict the
three-dimensional arrangement of the body, for
example the position of the leg tips. The pre-
dictive nature of the model is crucial as it al-
lows  exploiting  the  model  for  planning  ahead
(see below). It is important to note that while
we do not want to claim the existence of such a
model in insects, the functions of internal mod-
els are prediction, inverse function, and sensor
fusion, and these can all already be found in in-
sects.
3.2 Representation of the environment
Of  course,  internal  representation  should  also
contain  information  on  the  surroundings.  We
started with a focus on the body and want to
extend this network in a way that reflects how
the environment affords (Gibson 1979) itself to
the body, i.e., a focus on interaction with the
environment. 
As an example of how the reaCog archi-
tecture could be extended to include representa-
tion of meaningful parts of the environment, we
want to briefly sketch an expansion of Walknet
that  would  allow  for  insect-like  navigation
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(“Navinet”  Cruse & Wehner 2011;  Hoinville et
al. 2012). Navinet provides an output that will
be used by the body-model explained above to
guide  walking  direction.  Due  to  the  network,
the agent can make an informed decision about
which learned food source she  will  visit  (e.g.,
sources A, B or C), or if she is travelling back
home or not (Outbound, Inbound, respectively).
The output of Navinet is, in this way, on the
one hand tightly coupled to the control of walk-
ing and the representation of the body. On the
other hand, Navinet is constructed using motiv-
ation units in the same way as the walking con-
troller, and those motivation units take part in
the action-selection process. Importantly, Nav-
inet (like desert ants) shows the capability of
selective attention, since it is context dependent
and only responds to learned visual landmarks
in the appropriate context, i.e., when related to
the current active target food source. The struc-
ture of the motivation-unit network is sketched
in figure 4. Examples of possible stable internal
states  are  (Forage  –  Outbound –  source  A –
landmarks  associated  with  source  A)  or  (In-
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Figure 4: Motivation unit network of Navinet for the control of ant-like navigation. Unit Outbound controls travel
from the home to a food source (A, B, C) or a default search for a new source (D). Unit Inbound controls travel back
to the home. Memory elements (black boxes) contain position and quality of the food source (A, B, C) or information
on visual landmarks (landmark memory). 
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bound – landmarks  associated with Inbound),
for instance. As an interesting emergent prop-
erty,  Navinet  does not  presuppose  an explicit
“cognitive  map”.  Such  a  map-like  representa-
tion  has  been  assumed  necessary  by  several
other  authors  (Cruse &  Wehner 2011).  How
learning of food source positions and food qual-
ity is possible has been shown by  Hoinville et
al. (2012).
4 Planning ahead, cognition
Even though Walknet is set up as a fixed struc-
ture consisting of hard-wired connections of the
RNN, it can flexibly adapt to disturbances in
the environment as needed during, for instance,
crossing large gaps (Bläsing 2006). Nonetheless,
the system might of course run into novel situ-
ations that require an even higher degree of ad-
aption, and as such will require novel behaviors.
As an example, think of a situation in which all
the legs except the right hind leg are in the an-
terior  part  of  the  working  range.  When  the
right hind leg is forced to lift from the ground
as it approaches a position very far to the rear,
the whole system will become unstable, as the
center of gravity is positioned very far towards
the rear of the animal. In this case, the center
of gravity would not be supported by the other
legs, nor by the right hind leg that tries to start
a swing movement. As a consequence, the agent
would fall over, backwards. This problem could
be detected by “problem detectors”,  e.g.,  spe-
cific  sensory  input  that  reacts  to  the  specific
load  distribution  (a  different  solution  is  ex-
plained in section 8). In order to overcome this
problem, the system would have to break out of
its usual pattern of behavioral selection and try
to select a different behavioral module that is
usually not applicable in the given context. For
instance,  making  a  step  backward  with  the
right middle leg would be a possible solution, as
this  would  provide  support  for  the  body  and
would afterwards allow going back to the nor-
mal walking behavior and the subsequent swing
movement of the right hind leg. Usually, back-
ward steps can only be selected in the context
of backward walking.
Figure  6 shows an expansion that allows
the system to search for solutions that are not
connected to the current context. This expan-
sion is termed the “attention controller”. We in-
troduce  a  third  layer  of  units  (figure  6,  in
green),  that  is  essentially  a  recurrent  win-
ner-take-all network (WTA-net). For each mo-
tivation unit  there is  a corresponding partner
unit  in  this  WTA-network.  Currently-active
motivation units suppress their winner-take-all
(WTA) partner units (T-shaped connections in
figure 6). Therefore, a random activation of this
WTA-net  will  lead  to  the  activation  of  one
single unit not belonging to the currently- activ-
ated context. The random activation will be in-
duced by another parallel layer, the “Spreading
Activation Layer” (not depicted in figure 6, fur-
ther details are described in (Schilling & Cruse
submitted). The winning unit of the WTA layer
than  activates  its  corresponding  motivation
unit. This triggers the connected behavior that
can be tested as a solution to the problem at
hand.  The  network  follows  a  trial-and-error
strategy as observed in, e.g., insects. 
As has been proposed (Schilling & Cruse
2008), a further expansion of the system that
is, most probably, not given in insects is not
the testing of a behavior in reality, but instead
the application of a newly-selected behavior on
the body-model and the use of the model in-
stead of  the real  body.  The motor output is
routed to the body-model instead of to the real
body, and the real body is decoupled from the
control  system  while  testing  new  behaviors.
Due  to  the  predictive  nature  of  the
body-model, it can be used to predict possible
consequences and to afterwards decide if a be-
havior solves the current problem and should
be tried out on the real body. This procedure
is  called internal  simulation and requires  the
introduction  of  switches  that  reroute  motor
output signals from the real body to the body
model (figure 6, switch SW). Only after a suc-
cessful internal simulation will the behavior be
applied to the real body. McFarland & Bösser
(1993) defined a cognitive system as a system
that  has  the  ability  of  planning  ahead,  i.e.,
that is able to perform internal simulations in
order to predict possible outcomes of  behavi-
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ors.  Therefore,  this  latter  expansion  would
make the control system cognitive (for details
see Cruse & Schilling 2010b). 
5 Word-net and perceptual memory
In our network, we have up to this point only
dealt with procedural memories, i.e., memories
representing  the  connections  between  specific
sensorimotor elements that are able to control
specific  behaviors  (e.g.,  Swingnet,  landmark).
As a final extension, we will now show how the
network might also be equipped with some as-
pect  of  semantic  memory,  such  that  meaning
can be attributed to verbal expressions. To this
end, the network can be expanded through the
introduction of another layer (not shown in fig-
ure  6). In this fourth layer, verbal expressions
are stored as procedures or “Word-nets”. These
procedures can either be used to pronounce a
stored word or to comprehend it, i.e., they can
be used for motor control and for auditory per-
ception.  As  is  the  case  for  other  procedures,
each Word-net is  equipped with a motivation
unit.  As  the  motivation  units  of  Word-nets
have a specific function, for an easier distinction
we will call them word units (WU). Following
Steels (2007;  Steels &  Belpaeme 2005)  each
Word-net is related to a corresponding unit of
the  motivation  network  that  carries  meaning
(e.g., the motivation unit for walking is connec-
ted to a Word-net “walk”). The meaning of the
Word-nets is in this way grounded in the beha-
viors of the corresponding motivation units. As
an example, figure 7 shows a possible detail of
such  a  network,  including  some  elements  of
Walknet and Navinet. The motivation units of
a  procedure  (e.g.,  Swing  net)  and  its  corres-
ponding Word-net (e.g.,  “Swing”) are coupled
via  bidirectional  connections  (dashed
double-headed arrows). The connections cannot
be active at the same time, but depend on an
overall state of the network, termed “Report”
and “Perceive”. In the Perceive state, only con-
nections from the word unit to the motivation
unit of its non-word procedure can be activated
(from top to bottom in figure 7), whereas in the
Report state only the opposite connections can
be  activated.  As  can  be  seen  in  figure  7,
Word-nets can not only be connected with mo-
tivation units of the sensorimotor nets, but also
with motivation units that do not directly con-
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Figure 5: The body-model and its relation to the body of robot Hector (a). (b) shows the vectors forming the central
body (left) and the vectors forming one leg model (right). The central model and the leg-models are connected via the
shared “leg vector” (white arrows) that point from the hip to the tip of the leg (shown here for the left front leg only).
Walking direction and velocity are controlled by the input vectors pull_fw (forward) or pull_bw (backward) provided
by sensory input.
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trol  a  sensorimotor element (e.g.,  Walk,  Out-
bound).
What might be the function of this exten-
sion by Word-nets? In the Perceive state (or re-
act state), a perceived word, uttered by another
agent, will activate, via its word unit, its part-
ner’s motivation unit, and thereby possibly in-
fluence behavior  (depending on the actual  in-
ternal state of the system and on the strength
of the word input). When in the Report state,
the actually active motivation units will in turn
activate their corresponding word units, which
may  lead  to  an  uttering  of  a  word.  As,  of
course,  only  one  word  can  be  activated  at  a
given time, some kind of decision network (e.g.,
a WTA net) is required, though, for reasons of
simplicity, not shown in figure  7. In any case,
introduction of Word-nets allows for a very ba-
sic form of  communication between the agent
and  any  other  partner,  communication  being
limited to “one-word sentences”. 
As indicated on the left  side of  figure  7
(units “front”, “left”), further motivation units
might be introduced into the network that do
not have a direct function within, in this case,
the Walknet controller.  Of course, these units
may be connected to word units. (Note that we
do not deal with the question how these units
may be connected within the network through
training).
This  architecture  combines  sensorimotor
procedures  with  Word-nets  (which  by  them-
selves  represent  specific  sensorimotor  proced-
ures). Together, they form a simple case of se-
mantic  memory,  because  procedural  memory
representing an action (e.g., Swing-net) is con-
nected  with  a  memory  element  representing
verbal symbols. 
To illustrate the versatility of this archi-
tecture, we will briefly address how it can also
be  applied  in  order  to  embrace  perceptual
memory.  Following  ideas  of  O’Connor et al.
(2009),  Cruse &  Schilling (2010a) have shown
how an RNN, using the same elements as ap-
plied  here  for  the  motivation  unit  network,
could  be  used  to  construct  a  perceptual
memory. This network does not only allow the
representation of  directly  perceived perceptual
elements (e.g., the colour or shape of an object),
but also of superordinate concepts (e.g., Cow,
Animal,  four-legged).  Note  that  “four-legged”
might also be a feature of non-animals, e.g., a
table. Therefore, the ability of our network to
deal with heterarchical structures is advantage-
ous  for  perceptual  memory,  too.  Elements  of
such a distributed memory can also be connec-
ted to specific Word-nets (e.g.,  “red”, “Cow”,
“animal”), as has been explained above for the
sensorimotor motivation units. Correspondingly,
activation of one memory element of this per-
ceptual memory may elicit the uttering of the
corresponding word, and, in turn, when in Per-
ceive mode, the hearing of a word may activate
various elements of the procedural memory that
are associated with this word.
6 ReaCog: Emergent properties 
characterized by applying other levels 
of description 
To summarise,  the neural  controller  Walknet,
(for details see Dürr et al. 2004; Schilling et al.
2013a)  is  an  embodied  control  system
(first-order  embodiment,  cf.  Metzinger (2006,
2014). The reactive system can deal with vary-
ing  unpredictable  environments.  It  relies  only
on information  that  is  available  to  the  given
mechanosensors, which is possible because both
body and environment are integral to the over-
all computational system. In this way, the sys-
tem is embodied. Of course, the system has a
physical body, but even more, being embodied
means that properties of the body (like its geo-
metry)  are  exploited  in  computations  of  the
controller. Using its own body as part of a loop
through the world allows for dramatically sim-
plifying  computations  (Schmitz et  al. 2008).
These properties are of  course also present in
the expanded version, reaCog. Even though in
reaCog an internal body-model is introduced in
order  to  control  the  high  number  of  DoFs,
reaCog still relies heavily on the cooperation of
individual parts, i.e., the combination of coup-
lings between body, environment,  the internal
body model, and the controller itself. In addi-
tion, this internal model of its own body is used
for planning ahead. Such a network, following
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Metzinger (2006, 2014) represents a system that
is characterized by second-order embodiment. 
As shown in figure 2, the procedures form-
ing the decentralized controller are basically ar-
ranged in parallel, i.e., each procedure obtains
its  own sensory input and provides a  specific
motor output. But procedures can also receive
input  from other  procedures  and can  provide
output directly to other procedures. This relat-
ively flat, heterarchical structure is also applied
by  the  Word-nets  and  in  perceptual  memory
(Cruse & Schilling 2010a).
ReaCog  automatically  selects  actions  on
the lower reactive level. Several of these proced-
ures can be performed in parallel. On the cog-
nitive  level,  decisions  about  which  action  to
choose are not based solely on sensory input,
but are chosen depending on the imagined ac-
tion,  since  there  is  a  stochastic  effect  due  to
noise in the attention controller. The decision is
afterwards tested by internal simulation before
it is applied to the real system, and only after
successful  execution  is  the  proposed  behavior
stored in long-term memory. Therefore, this de-
cision process can be envisioned as a Darwinian
type  of  selection  that  begins  from  stochastic
“mutations” that are then tested for “fitness”
and selected based on this fitness. Thus, reaCog
is a minimally cognitive system in the sense of
the  definition  given  by  McFarland &  Bösser
(1993).
After we have defined the control network
quantitatively,  we  can use  reaCog to  analyze
emergent properties, which haven’t been imple-
mented  explicitly.  As  an  example  we  have
already  considered  a  term  like  “tripod  gait”
that is sensible on a behavioral level in order to
describe  the  emergent  overall  behavior  of  the
walker. But on the control level there is no ex-
plicit tripod gait controller in reaCog (Schilling
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Figure 6: The controller of the reactive system as depicted in figure 2 expanded by a WTA-net (green units, not all
connections are shown). Each WTA unit shows a bi-directional connection to a unit of the motivation unit network.
This architecture provides the basis of reaCog, as explained in the main text. (for further explanations see figure 2). 
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et al. 2008; Schilling et al. 2013a). The local in-
fluences coupling neighboring legs are respons-
ible  for  overall  coordinated  walking  behavior
(different  from  many  other  hexapod
controllers), and different gaits can emerge just
by choosing different velocities. Therefore, ap-
parent “gaits” or the observation that “cognit-
ive maps” are required can be seen an emergent
property of such a network.
In the following, we will turn to concepts
that are usually applied in fields different from
computer  science  or  behavioral  biology,  like
psychology and philosophy of  mind.  Choosing
another level of description can help us gain a
better understanding of the system on a more
abstract  level.  In  addition,  this  approach can
lead to more operational definitions for concepts
used in other disciplines. This is based on the
assumption that many of the above-mentioned
phenomena emerge (Vision 2011) and that they
can be used as concepts only on a higher, more
abstract level. 
For  some  authors,  consciousness  is
thought to be restricted to human beings.  In
contrast, other authors share the opinion that
there are degrees of consciousness and that con-
sciousness  does occur,  to  a smaller  degree,  in
lower-level  animals  (Dennett 1991).  Showing
that quite small and simplistic networks can al-
low for interesting cognitive properties (Chittka
&  Niven 2009;  Menzel et  al. 2007)  supports
such a view, as it  provides a plausible evolu-
tionary explanation for consciousness (or better
degrees  of  consciousness).  Agreeing  with  this
basic assumption, we want to analyze to what
extent our simple control network fulfils certain
aspects  of  consciousness  or  emotions,  even
though we did not intend to realize this in our
system in the beginning. The graded emergence
of such high-level concepts would offer an evol-
utionary account and might allow us to address
questions on the function, e.g., of consciousness,
and explain how it relates to the control of be-
havior.
7 Phenomenality 
Before  concentrating  on  specific  phenomena,
such  as  emotions  or  consciousness,  we  would
like to address a more fundamental aspect that
appears to be relevant for all higher-level phe-
nomena, namely the occurrence of subjective ex-
perience.
An  example  of  subjective  experience  is
pain. Even though it might be possible for us to
closely attend to all neuronal activities of a hu-
man test subject while stimulating that person’s
skin with a needle, the observed data would be
different  from the  experienced  pain,  which  is
only  felt  by  that  person.  Nobody  other  than
that person can feel the pain. This form of ex-
periencing  an  internal  perspective  is  therefore
only  accessible  to  us through self-observation.
Intuitively,  other  systems—like  non-living
things  or  simple  machines—lack  such  an  in-
ternal perspective. But in many cases, like for
animals, it is hard to determine whether they
have subjective experience or are merely reflex-
ive  machines  that  do  not  possess  an  internal
perspective.
This problem is also visible when we con-
sider a human brain, in the contrasting states of
being awake or  asleep,  for  example.  While  in
(dreamless) sleep or under anesthesia the same
neuronal systems as in a wakeful state may be
active, subjective experience is assumed not to
be present. And even in a normal wakeful state,
we are not aware of all the contents of the dif-
ferent neuronal activities that take place in our
brain. Therefore, only a specific type of neur-
onal activity seems to be accompanied by sub-
jective experience. 
There is only indirect evidence on the con-
ditions required for subjective experience. Libet
et  al. (1964)  performed  an  early  experiment,
where the cortex of a human subject was dir-
ectly stimulated, electronically. Only for stimuli
longer than 500 ms did the subjects report a
subjective experience. Bloch’s law (Bloch 1885)
formulates this connection more generally. The
subjectively-experienced strength of a stimulus
depends on the mathematical product of stimu-
lus  duration  and  stimulus  intensity.  In  other
words, a stimulus is  only experienced subject-
ively  when  the  temporally-integrated  stimulus
intensity surpasses a given threshold.
More recent experiments have studied the
concurrent  activation  of  different  procedures
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that compete for becoming subjectively experi-
enced. A basic experiment has been performed
by  Fehrer &  Raab (1962),  and has  been  fol-
lowed  by  detailed  later  studies  (Neumann &
Klotz 1994). First, participants learned to press
a button whenever a square was shown on a
screen, but not when two squares were shown in
a  position  on  the  screen  flanking  the  first
square. After the learning period was over, in
the experiment the single square was presented
for only a short period (about 30 ms), which
was then followed by a longer presentation of
the two squares.  The participants did not re-
port having seen the single square, but reported
only having seen the two squares. Nonetheless,
they  pressed  the  button.  This  result  shows,
first,  that  the  first  procedure  A  (“stimulus
single square-motor response”), can be executed
without being accompanied by subjective exper-
ience  of  stimulus  stimA,  the  single  square.
Second, procedure B (“stimulus double squares
—no motor response”) appears to influence how
the first procedure is experienced, i.e., this pro-
cedure  inhibits  the  subjective  experience  of
stimulus  stimA.  Therefore,  stimulus  stimA is
not subjectively experienced (the “masking” ef-
fect), but nonetheless triggers the motor reac-
tion.
This situation can be interpreted in the
following way (Figure  8,  left).  On the input
side, each procedure shows temporal dynamics
that  are  similar  to  that  of  a  low-pass  filter
(LPF) (see footnote on page 2) followed by an
integrator  (IntA,  IntB).6 Stimulation  of  one
procedure  inhibits  the  representation  of  the
other procedure for some limited time (figure
8,  Δt).  In  addition,  both  integrators  are
coupled via mutual inhibition (in figure 8 de-
picted by separate units). In the masking ex-
periment, the first stimulus (stimA) does not
inhibit the second procedure (B), because the
latter is not yet stimulated, as long as stimu-
lus  stimA  is  active.  In  contrast,  when  the
second stimulus,  stimB,  is  given,  the repres-
entation  of  procedure  A may be  suppressed.
The representation of the input given by units
IntA and IntB activate the corresponding mo-
6 An integrator performs a mathematical integration, i.e., it sums the
input over time.
tivation units (MU) of the procedures, MUA
and  MUB,  respectively.  This  could  be  ex-
plained if we assume two different thresholds.
First, the motor command of a procedure can
be elicited when a small threshold (thr1, fig-
ure  8)  is  reached.  But,  a  second,  larger
threshold (thr2, figure  8) must be reached in
order to have subjective experience. Then, in
our paradigm, procedure A, which was activ-
ated first, may reach the level of thr1, which
is sufficient to activate the motor output, but
not thr2. Only the second procedure, B, has
enough time to reach the state of  subjective
experience (thr2, figure 8, right), which allows
the double square (stimB) to become subject-
ively experienced (however this comes about).
The model therefore suffices to explain the ba-
sic  properties  characterizing  the  back-
ward-masking experiment. As has been shown
by Cruse & Schilling (2014), the structure de-
picted  in  figure  8 can  also  deal  with  a  for-
ward-masking  paradigm,  the  so-called  atten-
tional  blink  effect  (Schneider 2013).  To  fur-
ther describe another experiment, showing the
so  called  psychological  refractory  period
(PRP) paradigm (e.g., Zylberberg et al. 2011),
the motivation units (MUA, MUB) of proced-
ure A and procedure B are connected in such
a way as to inhibit each other. In other words,
the motivation units of these procedures form
a WTA network. In addition, each procedure
inhibits its own motivation unit after its ac-
tion has been completed. 
From these observations we conclude that
there  are specific  neuronal  states  that  require
time to be developed. While eliciting an output
signal (like a motor command) is the basic func-
tion of the system, this can happen without ac-
companying subjective experiences.  Only some
procedures may give rise  to  such phenomenal
experience and might, in addition, trigger sub-
sequent functions in the neural system. For ex-
ample,  this  procedure  may  be  able  to  access
more neuronal sources and perhaps allow faster
storing  of  new information  (e.g.,  for  one-shot
learning). In addition to such functional proper-
ties the network can endorse the (mental) prop-
erty of showing subjective experience, i.e.,  en-
tering the phenomenal state.
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The  experimental  findings  mentioned
above support a non-dualist,  or monist,  view,
which  means  that  there  are  no  separate  do-
mains (or “substances”), such as the mental and
the physical domain, in the sense that there are
causal influences from one domain to the other
one as postulated by substance dualism. Rather,
the impression of there being two “domains”—
often characterized as being separated by an ex-
planatory gap (Levine 1983)—, results from us-
ing different levels of descriptions.7
An explanation of the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions of neural networks that allow
for subjective experience would be extremely in-
teresting.  Even  though  there  currently  exist
only early insights or mere speculations, there
has been a lot of progress during the past few
years (review Schier 2009; Dehaene & Changeux
2011). The continuation of these research pro-
jects will hopefully yield a more detailed under-
standing. Using combinations of neurophysiolo-
gical and behavioral studies may lead a better
understanding  of  the  physiological  properties
and functions of this state. It is, however, gen-
erally assumed that even if we knew the phys-
ical details at some future time, we would not
understand why this state, which is character-
ized by physical properties, is accompanied by
phenomenal  experience.  Here  we  propose  an-
other view. We assume that this problem will
be “solved” such that the question concerning
the explanatory gap will  simply disappear,  as
has happened in the case of explaining the oc-
currence of life. Concerning the latter, there was
an  intensive  debate  between  Vitalists  and
Mechanists at the beginning of the last century
on how non-living matter could be transformed
into living matter. The Vitalists argued that a
special, unknown force, termed  vis vitalis, was
required.  After  many decades  of  intensive  re-
search, we are in a position where an internal
model is available, which represents the obser-
vation  that  a  specific  collection  and  arrange-
ment of molecules is endowed with the property
of living. This and similar cases may be general-
7 There are various views adopting a monist approach, that differ in
detail (epiphenomenalism, emergentism, property dualism and their
many derivatives, see Vision 2011). We will not enter into this dis-
cussion here.
ized as the following rule: If we have enough in-
formation, such that we can develop an internal
model  of  the  phenomena  under  examination,
and if it is sufficiently detailed to allow the pre-
diction of the properties of the system, we have
the impression of having understood the system.
In the case of life, indeed we do not need a vis
vitalis any  longer,  but  consider  liveliness  an
emergent  property.  Correspondingly,  we  pro-
pose that if we knew the functional details and
conditions that lead to matter having subjective
experience well enough, so that the appearance
of  subjective  experience  can  be  predicted,  we
would have the impression of having understood
the  problem.  Therefore,  we  assume  that  the
question of the explanatory gap will disappear
at some point, as was the case in the example of
life.
Adopting a monist view allows us to con-
centrate on the functional aspects when trying
to compare systems endowed with the phenom-
enality, i.e., human beings, with animals or arti-
ficial systems. According to this view, phenom-
enality is considered a property that is directly
connected  with  specific  functions  of  the  net-
work. This means that mental phenomena that
are characterized by phenomenal properties—as
are, for example, attention, intention, volition,
emotion,  and  consciousness—can be  examined
by concentrating on the aspect of information
processing (Neisser 1967).
To avoid  possible  misunderstandings,  we
want to stress that we do not mean that the
phenomenal aspect does not have any function
in the sense that the system would work in the
same  way  if  there  was  no  such  phenomenal
properties.  Since,  according  to  our  view,  the
phenomenality  necessarily  arises  with  such  a
system, a version of such a system showing ex-
actly  the  same  functions  but  not  having  the
phenomenal  aspect  would  not  be  possible.  A
change in the phenomenal properties of a sys-
tem has to be accompanied by a change in its
functional properties.  Functional and phenom-
enal aspects are two sides of one coin. However,
remaining on the functional side makes the dis-
cussion much easier.
To summarize, the content of any memory
element  may  be  subjectively  experienced  (or
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available to conscious awareness) if (1) the (un-
known) neuronal structures that allow for the
neural  dynamics  required  for  the  phenomenal
aspect to occur are given, and (2) the strength
and duration of the activation of the memory
element is large enough, provided the element is
not inhibited by competing elements. 
The question of how any system can pos-
sibly have subjective experience was famously
called the “hard problem” by Chalmers (1997).
Adopting  a  monist  view,  we  can  avoid  this
question and leave it open, as we are interested
in understanding the functional aspects of con-
sciousness (on the ethical implications of an ar-
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Figure 7: The reactive network expanded by a layer containing procedures that represent words (Word-net, upper
row). The motivation unit of a Word-net (WU) is bi-directionally connected (dashed double-headed arrows) with the
corresponding motivation unit of the reactive system containing procedural elements of Walknet (left, see figure 2) and
of Navinet (right, see figure 4). The word stored in a Word-net is indicated as (“ ... ”). Not all of these motivation
units have to be connected with a Word-net.
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tificial system having subjective experience im-
plemented in appropriate neural dynamics see
Metzinger 2009, 2013). Regarding what kind of
dynamics could be thought of, it has been spec-
ulated that subjective experience might occur in
a  recurrent  neural  network  that  is  equipped
with attractor properties. Following this hypo-
thesis, subjective experience would occur if such
a network approached its attractor state (Cruse
2003). This  assumption would mean that any
system showing an attractor might be endowed
with the phenomenon of subjective experience.
It may, however, not have all the other proper-
ties characterizing consciousness. On the other
hand, there might be systems in which the func-
tional aspects currently attributed to conscious-
ness are fulfilled, but where there is no subject-
ive experience present. This case would imply
that our list representing the functions of con-
sciousness as given in section  10 below is not
yet complete. 
In  the  following  two  sections  we  shall
briefly  treat  two  phenomena—emotions  and
consciousness—and discuss how they might be
related  to  the  minimally-cognitive  system  as
represented by reaCog.
8 Emotions 
Most authors generally agree that emotions are
accompanied by subjective experience and that
they have the function of helping the subject re-
spond adaptively to environmental pressures. So
there is the phenomenal aspect of emotions as
well as a functional aspect. As we have already
treated the phenomenal aspect above, here we
will put aside this aspect, i.e., how it feels to be
happy, sad, etc., and concentrate on the func-
tional aspect of emotions.
Even  though  several  authors  assume  or
even demand that emotions are already present
in simple reactive systems, and that they are
necessary  for  a  cognitive  system  (Valdez &
Mehrabian 1994),  in  our above  description  of
the properties of the network reaCog, any emo-
tional aspects have not been taken into account.
We did not require the term “emotions” to ex-
plain our approach, nor have we built in any
kind of explicit emotional system. However, we
will  argue  that  there  are  emerging  properties
that are comparable to what is usually ascribed
to properties of emotional systems. In the fol-
lowing, we want to focus on which parts in our
system take this role and how the functions of
these parts can be described and related to at-
tributes of emotional systems. 
The attempt to relate the properties of our
network with the concept of emotions appears
not  very  promising  at  first  sight,  because  a
series of interrelated conceptual terms such as
emotions,  attitudes,  motivations,  sentiments,
moods, drives, and feelings can be found in the
literature,  and  are  defined  in  different  but
partly  overlapping  ways  by  different  authors
(Pérez et al. 2012). The reason for this disagree-
ment might be that there are indeed no clearly
separable  mechanisms  underlying  these  phe-
nomena but rather we are dealing with a hol-
istic  system,  which  makes  separation  into
clear-cut concepts difficult, if not impossible. As
mentioned,  the  problem  of  being  confronted
with  heterarchical  structures  appeared  when
looking  at  the  reactive  level  (and  reappeared
later  when  dealing  with  perceptual  memory),
which led us to the neutral term “motivation
unit“ for all “levels” of the heterarchy formed
by  the  motivation  unit  network.  To  simplify
matters, we will only deal with the term emo-
tions in the following.
What might be possible functions of emo-
tions? As follows from the examples of overlap-
ping conceptual approaches found in the literat-
ure and mentioned below, emotions are attrib-
uted to various functions characterized by dif-
ferent  levels  of  complexity.  These  range  from
enabling the agent to select sensory input (e.g.,
tunnel  vision,  Pérez et  al. 2012) and activate
different procedures, or, at a higher level, to se-
lect between different behavioral demands (e.g.,
hunger  –  thirst,  flight  –  fight,  Parisi &  Pet-
rosino 2010) up to more abstract states such as
suffering  from sadness  or  being  in  a  state  of
happiness and controlling the corresponding be-
haviors (e.g., Ekman 1999). The lower-level de-
cisions are well covered by our motivation unit
network, and form a heterarchical system show-
ing  attractor  states  (e.g.,  swing  –  stance,  In-
bound – Outbound). These states allow for se-
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lection of sensory input and/or motor proced-
ures  that  are  stimulated  by sensory  input  to
specific motivation units.  In the following, we
therefore focus on higher-level states,  such as,
for  example,  emotions,  as  listed  by  Ekman
(1999).
In  general,  and  as  discussed  below,  one
can  distinguish  between  prototypical  ap-
proaches and reductionist approaches—the lat-
ter simplifying emotions down to just a few ba-
sic dimensions. In current research, both views
appear to be justified as they both try to de-
scribe the phenomena observed, though at dif-
ferent levels of description.
Following the first approach, research tries
to trace emotions back to a set of basic emo-
tions, the combination of which can explain fur-
ther derived emotions. This approach has been
advocated by Plutchik (1980). A problem with
such  an  approach  is  how  to  draw  borders
between emotions and what counts as a basic
emotion. Ekman (1999) proposed a list of char-
acteristics  of  similarity  between emotions  and
came up with a set of fifteen basic emotions.
Later on, based on their relation to facial ex-
pressions, he reduced this number to six. This
set, which is now widely used as the basic set of
emotions in many different contexts, consists of
happiness, anger, disgust, sadness, fear, and sur-
prise. As an example, let us consider happiness.
Happiness is elicited when we are in a state of
having had or expecting positive situations. The
behavioral effect of happiness might be charac-
terized as being open to new ideas, perhaps not
being too critical and open to performing new,
unconventional  behaviors.  How  might  such  a
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Figure 8: (a) A hypothetical network that is capable of dealing with some dual task experiments, for example the
backward masking experiment. Stimulation of one of the procedures, A or B, activates a low-pass filter (LPFA, LPFB)
followed by an integrator (IntA, IntB) and inhibits the corresponding units of the other procedure for a limited time
(Δt). The integrators are coupled via mutual inhibition. After activation of one of the integrator units has reached
threshold thr1 (lower dashed line), the corresponding motor motivation unit (MuA or MuB), coupled via mutual inhib-
ition, is activated, which drives the behavior. If threshold thr2 (upper dashed line) is reached, the stimulus can be phe-
nomenally experienced. A feedback from the procedure can provide an “end” signal to inhibit its own motivation unit.
(b) Temporal development of the activation of some units (procedure A, blue, procedure B, red). Abscissa is relative
time. If stimB follows briefly after stimA, the unit IntA may reach its motor threshold thr1, but not the threshold thr2
for eliciting the phenomenal experience. In contrast, stimB elicits both the motor output and the phenomenal experi -
ence that corresponds to the backward masking effect (for details see Cruse & Schilling 2014).
www.open-mind.net
phenomenon be represented in reaCog? First of
all, a neuronal state of the motivation network
would correspond to a specific emotion. Such a
network state is usually triggered by some sens-
ory stimulus eliciting an emotion. This stimulus
activates  specific,  basically  innate,  networks
which,  when active,  influence  the  system and
put it into the respective emotional state. Such
a network—which could, in the most reduced
case, consist of just one neuronal unit—has not
been introduced in reaCog, but if  assumed as
given, it may modulate meta-control parameters
such as, for example, noise levels, thresholds, or
learning rates  (Doya 2000,  2002).  To stick to
our example of “happiness”, activation of such a
network,  which  represents  stimulus  situations
considered to elicit this state may, within the
Spreading Activation Layer, lead to a faster dif-
fusion  process,  perhaps supported  by stronger
noise amplitude. Such a broadening of the at-
tention range as a consequence of positive af-
fects  has been reported by  Dreisbach &  Gos-
chke (2004). In addition, or as an alternative,
the threshold for the problem detectors that we
mentioned in section 4 might be increased. As a
consequence, the system would take more risks.
All these changes would lead to an increase in
“creativity”, i.e., the ability to find new ideas
for possible solutions. Corresponding structures
might be found in the other basic emotions lis-
ted by Ekman.
In the second group of approaches to char-
acterizing the emotions, emotions are described
through a set of dimensions that represent the
emotional  state.  We  will  briefly  sketch  this
seemingly alternative reductionist approach and
will again draw parallels with reaCog. The con-
nection to reaCog is made on a different level
and is therefore not logically exclusive with re-
spect  to the former.  Wundt (1863) was quite
opposed to the idea of breaking down emotions
into a set of basic emotions that serve as proto-
types, mainly because he assumed that a set of
emotions  is  better  described  by  a  continuum
than by separable  categories.  This  follows  his
idea  of  describing  emotions  through  principal
components leading to dimensional systems, like
the  pleasure-arousal-dominance  (PAD)  frame-
work  (Mehrabian 1996).  In  the  PAD  frame-
work, three dimensions span the space of  the
emotions.  The  first  describes  the  state
pleasure–displeasure and corresponds to the af-
fective state (excited – relaxed). Arousal, as the
second dimension, represents the level of mental
alertness and physical activity (tense – sleepy).
The  third  axis  describes  the  level  of
dominance–submissiveness,  i.e.,  the  feeling  of
being in control. The three factors of the PAD
framework have successfully been employed as
semantic  differential  factors  to  describe  emo-
tional states in different contexts, e.g., for de-
scribing  postures,  facial  expressions,  gestures,
and vocal expression. The three dimensions ap-
pear to be sufficient as they capture large parts
of  the  variance  (Mehrabian 1996).  Mehrabian
has related  the three  traits—pleasure,  arousal
and dominance—to specific cognitive character-
istics.  First,  pleasure-displeasure,  according  to
Mehrabian, deals with the fulfillment of expect-
ations.  Fulfillment  of  an  expectation  (or  not)
occurs  when,  during  a  problematic  situation,
planning ahead is activated and after some time
and searching a solution is  found (or not)—a
state that can be found in reaCog, too. But ful-
fillment  of  expectation  might  also  occur  at
lower levels, when, for example, a simple pro-
cedure such as Swingnet is equipped with a tar-
get value and this goal is either reached or not.
The error signal might then be used as a meas-
ure for fulfillment of expectation. For example,
it might be used as problem detector in the case
mentioned earlier, when a subject tries to lift a
leg off the ground, but due to an inconvenient
load distribution, the body falls down and the
leg remains in contact with the substrate. The
arousability trait, as introduced by  Mehrabian
(1996), was meant to incorporate the process of
“stimulus screening”. In short, “stimulus screen-
ing” is a process of attentional focusing. Such a
process of focusing attention occurs in our sys-
tem, too, as, on the one end of the spectrum,
the system broadly attends to all environmental
influences as perceived through its sensors, and
this is characterized as its being in the “reactive
state”.  At the other  extreme,  when a specific
problematic situation occurs, it is necessary to
focus attention and to guide the search for a
solution towards specific modalities, parts of the
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body, etc. But even on the reactive level, atten-
tion selection can be observed, as we mentioned
earlier. Finally, the dominance trait (“general-
ized expectations of control”  Mehrabian 1996)
concerns the extent  to which the agent  takes
over in the actual situation and is not only re-
sponding and reacting,  which  agrees  with the
main thesis of our approach, namely that it is
possible  to  switch  between the  reactive  mode
and  the  cognitive  mode.  Similarly,  Russell &
Norvig (2003)  have  required  an  autonomous
agent to be able to both react to known situ-
ations and to be in control of the situation itself
(or as Russell and Norvig call it: being proact-
ive). 
Our approach, as we have mentioned, does
not aim to build specific emotional properties,
but tries to build a functional autonomous sys-
tem and then to look at  the aspects  of  emo-
tional  properties  that  might  be  found  in  the
network or gained after some further functional
expansion of  the network. We have listed ex-
amples  from different  levels  of  description  in
psychology and point  to  related  properties  in
our network. We are not arguing that reaCog
has emotions (we are in any case agnostic with
respect  to  the  subjective  aspect).  Rather,  we
claim that by taking a network like reaCog as a
scaffold,  different  conceptualizations  of  the
functional aspects of emotions can be mapped
onto such a quantitatively defined system and
thus be considered emergent properties.
It might be added here that recent studies
support the idea that emotion-like states do in-
deed occur in brains which are by far less com-
plex than mammalian brains. Yang et al. (2014)
could show that the concept of “learned uncon-
trollability”, generally considered as an animal
model  for  depression  as  observed  in  humans,
can  be  found  in  Drosophila,  too.  For  verteb-
rates, it is known that stress induces the state
of fear or of anxiety, the latter being considered
as a second order emotion. Fossat et al. (2014)
could show that a crayfish treated by stressors
(i) avoids illuminated parts of the environment
and (b) shows an increased level of serotonin in
the brain, as can be observed in vertebrates. As
in vertebrates, the state of anxiety could be re-
lieved by application of anxiolytic drugs. Both
results have been interpreted such that the abil-
ity to adopt emotional states must have been
evolved before the separation of the arthropods
and vertebrates.
9 Attention, volition and intention 
In the following section we want to turn to at-
tention, intention, and volition. To what degree
can those properties be attributed to our sys-
tem? We start from the definitions of attention
provided by Desimone & Duncan (1995), of in-
tention  from  Pacherie (2006)  and  Goschke
(2013), and of volition from Goschke (2013).
Attention is the ongoing selection process
in perception. It can be driven bottom-up, i.e.,
by sensory influences, or it can be controlled by
top-down  influences  (Desimone &  Duncan
1995). Top-down driving of  attention depends
on the internal  or  emotional  state and might
depend on familiarity with the stimulus. 
We can indeed find properties correspond-
ing to attention in reaCog. The motivation net-
work  is  constituted  of  local  clusters  of  units
that  always  compete  on  this  local  level  and
form in this way coalitions of units and small
subclusters. As an example, we introduced the
selection of procedures at the leg level. Either a
swing or a stance motivation unit can be active
and  inhibits  the  other  one.  These  two  units
compete for control of behavior. Sensory units
can influence this competition. For example, an
incoming  ground-contact  signal  ends  a  swing
movement and initiates stance activation. After
activating the “Stance” unit only sensory input
relevant to stance can be perceived by the sys-
tem, but not inputs relevant to swing. There-
fore, this case corresponds to bottom-up atten-
tion control.
Such competition can also be found on a
global level, on which different behaviors can be
chosen. The activation of these higher-level ele-
ments influences the lower level. This activation
provides  a  context  for  the  lower  level,  which
guides the selection process on that level and
decides which sensory inputs might be relevant.
Thereby, more global clusters control the atten-
tion on the lower levels in a top-down fashion.
Corresponding examples can be found in Nav-
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inet,  which we mentioned earlier.  Only visual
signals concerning landmarks that belong to the
current  active  context  are  considered  and
switching between contexts only becomes pos-
sible  after  the  food source  has  been  depleted
and found empty.
The cognitive expansion of reaCog repres-
ents  another  case of  top-down influence.  This
system  comes  up  with  new  behaviors  and
probes them via internal  simulation.  As men-
tioned, there is a specific WTA layer that mir-
rors the arrangement of the lower motor control
layer (figure  6, green units).  This part of the
controller  can  be  called  an  “attention
controller”, as the explicit function of this layer
is to narrow down the search for suitable beha-
vior and to actively select a single one. We call
this selection a cognitive decision, as the system
is supposed to select a behavior that would not
normally  be  triggered  through the  given  con-
text. In this way the system represents a special
type of top-down attention. The focusing mech-
anism may correspond to what sometimes has
been  termed  “spot  light”  (Baars &  Franklin
2007 p. 955). Overall, we can therefore observe
three different types of attentional influences in
reaCog.
Volition  is  an  umbrella  term  denoting
mechanisms allowing for voluntary actions. The
latter are “actions that are not fully determined
by the immediate stimulus situation but depend
on mental representations of intended goals and
anticipated effects” (Goschke 2013). For an out-
side observer, voluntary actions cannot be pre-
dicted. As mentioned above, it is crucial for the
cognitive expansion that it can select behaviors
that are not triggered by the current situation.
The system has to invent new behaviors. Even
though the consequences of these behaviors are
predicted,  from the outside the finally chosen
behavior  is  not  predictable,  as  this  invention
and selection of new behaviors is stochastic to
some extent. The application of internal simula-
tion only guarantees that the proposed behavior
will  lead  to  a  solution,  but  it  does  not  give
away  which  behavior  will  be  chosen.  To  the
contrary, the search space of possible solutions
can easily become very large and has to be re-
stricted. Such restrictions help to span a tract-
able space of possible solutions. In our example,
reaCog looks first for solutions in the morpholo-
gical  neighborhood,  i.e.,  it  tries  to  use  the
neighboring legs  to help find a solution for a
locally-given problem. There are still many pos-
sible behaviors that must be tested in a some-
what  random order.  The  system will  end  up
with one that has been anticipated as a solution
in internal simulation, but this solution is not
selected through sensory inputs or the current
context as such. Therefore, volition may be at-
tributed to a system like reaCog.
Does an agent controlled by reaCog show
intentions? Intentions are present when the con-
trolled action is goal-directed. We are following
Pacherie (2006), who proposes a differentiation
of  three  types  of  intentions  (based  on  Brat-
man’s  (1987)  original  differentiation  into  two
such types). Pacherie distinguishes future-direc-
ted as  well  as  present-directed intentions and
introduces  motor-intentions  as  a  third  type.
Present-directed intentions are considered to be
under  “conscious”  (or  “rational”)  control.  In
contrast,  motor  intentions  are  related  to
lower-level  function  (Pacherie 2006).  Defining
for these types of intention is that they provide
guidance  for  the  function  on  the  respective
level.  In reaCog, motor-intentions are realized
by the fact that, on the reactive-control level,
behaviors can be selected based on the context.
Present-directed intentions can be found on the
level  of  cognitive  decision.  Future-directed in-
tensions are not treated by reaCog, because its
architecture in the current version only allows
for dealing with problems that occur in the con-
text of current walking behavior. However, an
expansion of  reaCog that would include plan-
ning ahead using Navinet as a substrate would
include future-directed intensions, too.
Goschke (2013)  defines  intentions  as
“causal preconditions explaining why a particu-
lar stimulus triggers a particular action (rather
than  a  different  action)”  (Goschke 2013,  p.
415). In other words, “intentions can be said to
shape the “attractor  landscape” of  an agent’s
behavioral state space” (Kugler et al. 1990, ref.
from Goschke 2013, p. 415). In reaCog, such an
attractor landscape is described by the motiva-
tion unit network. As explained in the preced-
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ing paragraph on attention, the activation of a
context guides, in a top-down fashion, both the
selection of a suitable behavior as well as which
sensory inputs the system should attend to. The
lower-level activation and incoming sensory in-
puts influence, on the one hand, the adaptive
execution of the behavior as such. On the other
hand, the sensory input can inform the higher
level in bottom-up fashion and might indirectly
trigger  changes  on  this  higher-level,  too.  The
activation on the higher level will, however, be
in general more stable on a temporal scale and
will reflect a specific context as well as relate to
specific goals. For example, in the case of Nav-
inet, there are different possible goals, such as
food sources or the nest, which are represented
in  the  higher-level  network.  Selecting  one  of
these as a goal will guide the overall function of
the system, as its behavior is directed towards
approaching  that  location,  while  the  sensory
system will attend only to the specific (expec-
ted) sensory stimuli. Therefore, reaCog can be
assumed to show goal-directed behavior and in-
tentions.
10 Consciousness 
In this section we would like to discuss to what
extent  properties  of  consciousness  might  be
found in our system. Even though we start from
a common notion of how consciousness can be
viewed as consisting of separable domains, we
are  well  aware  that  this  approach is  not  the
only or ultimate solution for approaching this
question.  But  such  a  differentiation  appears
well-suited for our bottom-up approach. 
Overall,  many authors  contribute  to  the
view in which consciousness is broken down into
a set of properties. We start from a review by
Cleeremans (2005), who gives a good overview
on the diverse philosophical views on conscious-
ness and tries to integrate them into one frame-
work.  While  there  is  disagreement  in  general
and also on the details (see also  Vision 2011),
Cleeremans  interestingly  finds  a  common  de-
nominator between the different opinions that
characterize possible computational correlates of
consciousness. He introduced a differentiation of
consciousness  into  three  domains:  phenomenal
consciousness,  access  consciousness,  and meta-
cognition (or in other contexts referred to as re-
flexive consciousness). There is disagreement on
the  phenomenal  aspect,  as  it  is  seen  by  one
group of philosophers to be an independent do-
main. In contrast, there is also a view in which
phenomenality cannot be separated from meta-
cognition and access consciousness, but must be
seen in relation to those (see review Cleeremans
2005).
We have argued in section 7, that the phe-
nomenal  aspect  as  such,  i.e.,  the  property  of
some  neuronal  structures  that  are  equipped
with subjective experience, has  per se no func-
tion, but is, nonetheless, not separable from the
functional properties. Therefore, we see the phe-
nomenal aspect not as a separate type of con-
sciousness, but as a property of both access con-
sciousness  and  metacognition.  This  view  has
convincingly been supported by  Kouider et al.
(2010) as well as, in a recent review, by Cohen
&  Dennett (2011). Therefore, we will compare
properties  of  reaCog  with  current  definitions
found in the literature concerning the phenom-
ena of access consciousness and metacognition,
abstracting from the phenomenal aspect. 
While other philosophers require metacog-
nition or reflexive consciousness in a system in
order  to  attribute  consciousness  (see  for  ex-
ample Rosenthal 2002 or Lau & Rosenthal 2011
for a recent review defending this view), we do
not want and cannot get into this discussion as
it is not our goal to review the different types of
taxonomies. We basically follow one valid and
common  perspective,  as  presented  by  Cleere-
mans, and apply it to our system in order to
analyze functions of our system that can match
the different phenomena described. We do not
aim with this approach to give a rigorous defini-
tion of consciousness (which does not seem suit-
able at this point, see also Holland & Goodman
2003). Instead, applying our approach, we aim
to provide insight into specific functions of our
system that  are  connected  to  the  phenomena
discussed.
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10.1 Access consciousness 
In this section we want to focus on the aspects
of  access  consciousness  that  can  be  found  in
reaCog. Following Cleeremans, access conscious-
ness  of  a  system is  defined  by the ability  to
plan ahead, to guide actions, and to reason, as
well as to report verbally on the content of in-
ternal  representations.  In  contrast,  non-con-
scious representations cannot be used this way.
Selecting behaviors, planning ahead, and guid-
ing actions are the central tasks of reaCog (see
section 4, Planning ahead).
Being able to use internal representations
for  verbal  report  is  currently  not  a  part  of
reaCog. However, the internal representation of
reaCog is already suited to allow for accessing
internal representations (section 5 and figure 7).
The simple solution proposed allows for commu-
nication  using  one-word  sentences  only,  but
provides  a  way,  within  the  framework  of
reaCog, for the symbol-grounding problem to be
addressed.  Steels (2007;  Steels &  Belpaeme
2005) and Narayanan (1997) have already stud-
ied in detail how more complex sentences may
be grounded in simple reactive systems. Thus,
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there  already  exists  work  on  similar  systems
that shows how the ability to report by using
more complex language structures could be im-
plemented in a reactive system. Therefore,  at
least in principle, this property could be real-
ized in reaCog, too. 
The  last  property  describing  access  con-
sciousness, symbolic reasoning, is not addressed
by reaCog. In the symbolic domain, there are,
however, many interesting approaches in the lit-
erature  that  might  be connected to  a system
like  reaCog after  the symbolic  level  has  been
implemented.
Concerning  related  work,  Dehaene &
Changeux (2011) review relevant network mod-
els that are supposed to simulate consciousness,
including their own approach, which is termed
global  neural  workspace  theory  (GNW)  (see
also  Seth 2007 for  a  systematic  summary).  A
comparison  of  reaCog  with  these  approaches
can be found in Cruse & Schilling (2013)). Here
we  will  only  refer  to  one  important  notion,
“global availability” as used by several authors
to represent a crucial  property of  access  con-
sciousness (e.g., Dehaene & Changeux 2011; De-
haene &  Naccache 2001;  Baars &  Franklin
2007; Cleeremans 2005). Global availability de-
scribes the notion that many representations of
the  system  can  potentially  become  conscious.
These representations can be selected to solve a
current  problem (as  described  for  reaCog)  or
could be selected in a task (see GNW). 
Are  the  representations  used  in  reaCog
globally  accessible?  During  execution  of  a
form of  behavior  the  reactive  system simply
reacts to sensory inputs. Single local modules
of the procedural memory are activated by the
context,  for  example,  the  walking  behavior
that can execute walking even in a cluttered
environment. While the behavior is driven by
sensory  stimuli,  it  is  not  “cognitively  atten-
ded”  and  runs  automatically  in  response  to
direct  interaction  with  the  environment.  In
this case, the representations are not attended
by cognitive expansion and are clearly not a
part of access consciousness. But, importantly,
this can change whenever a problem is detec-
ted and the reactive (automatic) system is not
sufficient  anymore.  In  such  a  case,  the
WTA-net of the attention controller is activ-
ated and has to select one of the elements of
the  procedural  memory.  During  planning,
these elements become accessible to the atten-
tion  system (Norman &  Shallice 1986).  The
WTA-net, which constitutes the essential part
of  the  attention  controller,  projects  directly
back to the motivation units of the procedural
memories  (figure  6,  dashed  arrows)  and
thereby selects just one of the possible behavi-
ors  (due  to  the  characteristics  of  a  Win-
ner-Take-All network). Therefore, all the pro-
cedural  modules  that  could  be  activated  by
the  attention  controller  are  “globally  avail-
able”  and  form  possible  elements  of  access
consciousness.
10.2 Further relations between reaCog and
access consciousness
Another  interesting  property  of  reaCog  and
findings  in  psychology  concern  the  relation
between conscious and automatic procedures. It
is well known that humans are able to learn a
new behavior by consciously attending to that
behavior.  Over time, this can change and the
execution  of  the  behavior  becomes  more  and
more automatic, i.e., it is no longer necessary to
be consciously aware of the exact execution of
the behavior. A similar shift of attention can be
found when reaCog is planning new behaviors.
Triggered by the activation  of  a  problem de-
tector, reaCog has to shift its attention towards
the new behavior during planning and the fol-
lowing execution of a behavior. As long as the
problem-detector is still active, the reactive sys-
tem is basically suspended (by switching off the
loop through the body), and instead the plan-
ning system tries out new procedures that have
to be attended to. After the successful execution
the new solution can also be stored as a proced-
ural memory and become part of the reactive
system; it does not require cognitive attention
anymore (the procedure how to store this  in-
formation  has  not  yet  been  implemented  in
reaCog). An advantage of this integration into
the  reactive  system is  that  access  to  reactive
procedures  is  faster  than  using  the  cognitive
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process,  which  agrees  with  the  findings  men-
tioned above. 
There  are  other  experimental  findings
highlighting the relation between conscious and
non-conscious  access  to  procedural  elements.
Beilock et  al. (2002) found that  athletes  who
have learned a behavior so that it can be per-
formed automatically perform worse when they
concentrate on the behavior compared to when
performing the behavior while being distracted.
In the attention controller of reaCog we can ob-
serve  a  similar  phenomenon.  If  the  attention
controller  is  externally  activated  by  a
higher-level unit while the connected behavior is
performed, this could possibly activate learning.
Such an influence would change the underlying
neuronal module and could worsen the result.
In  contrast,  without  attention  the  behavior
would  be  performed  as  it  had  been  learned
earlier.
ReaCog  differs  in  an  important  aspect
from the simulation studies conducted by De-
haene  and  colleagues,  as  well  as  from those
conducted by Baars and colleagues. While the
latter approaches aim to relate conscious func-
tioning to individual brain areas or brain cir-
cuits, reaCog is not intended at all as a model
of  the  human brain  or  any of  its  areas.  In-
stead,  it  is  envisioned  as  a  reductionist  ap-
proach  that  focuses  only  on  function.  From
the bottom-up development of more and more
higher-level function we offer a post-hoc dis-
cussion  of  the  question  of  to  what  extent
reaCog shows aspects of access consciousness.
This approach seems particularly suitable for
addressing  access  consciousness,  as  it  turns
out that there is no single identifiable part of
reaCog that might be attributed the property
of  access  consciousness.  Instead,  access  con-
sciousness appears to be an emergent property
constituted by the complete system. Attention
controller,  procedural  memory,  and  the  con-
nections between those two parts, as well as
the internal model and the ability to use it in
internal  simulation,  seem to  be  the  required
structures that allow access consciousness, or,
in other words, together constitute the “neural
workspace.” The dynamics of the neural work-
space  as  defined  by  Dehaene &  Naccache
(2001) are given through the WTA-net. But,
and this is an important difference, there no
re-representation  in  this  neural  workspace  is
necessary. The already-present representations
can be reused in novel contexts. The existing
modules  of  procedural  memory  are  recruited
in  the  internal  simulation  when  planning
ahead. The only difference is that the body is
decoupled from the control  loop and instead
the loop through the world is  replaced by a
loop using  internal  models  and  their  predic-
tions as feedback. Together, these representa-
tions form the global workspace (this notion
of  internal  models  has  been  termed
“second-order  embodiment,”  c.f.  Metzinger
2014). 
Koch &  Tsuchiya (2007) differentiate at-
tention  and  consciousness,  as  both  can  be
present individually and independently of each
other. They conclude that different mechanisms
are responsible for attention and consciousness.
While such a differentiation is of course based
on basic definitions, we can indeed identify dif-
ferent  mechanisms  related  to  these  two  phe-
nomena, even though they seem to be related.
In reaCog,  attending to a specific  stimulus is
modelled as a specific activation of motivation
units. Only if this activation is strong enough
and/or active for enough time, can the proced-
ure enter the phenomenal state (section  7, fig-
ure  8). Therefore, both attention and the phe-
nomenal aspect of consciousness refer to differ-
ent, but tightly coupled properties of our sys-
tem.
10.3 Metacognition
Although in this article we use the term cogni-
tion in the strict sense as proposed by McFar-
land & Bösser (1993), when dealing with meta-
cognition, this definition is no longer generally
applicable.  Therefore, in this section the term
cognition is  used in  the usual,  more qualitat-
ively-defined way. We will describe how the mo-
tivation unit network could be expanded to al-
low our agent to be endowed with different as-
pects of metacognition. These expansions, how-
ever, have not yet been simulated by being im-
plemented into the complete network.
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Metacognition,  or  reflexive  consciousness
(sometimes  called  metarepresentation),  the
second  essential  domain  of  consciousness,  ac-
cording to  Block (1995,  2001) and  Cleeremans
(2005),  is  characterized  by  Lau &  Rosenthal
(2011) as “cognition that is about another cog-
nitive  process  as  opposed to about objects  in
the world” (p. 365).
While the selection of procedures for con-
trol of behavior may occur on the reactive level
or by application of access consciousness, meta-
cognition in addition is able to exploit informa-
tion concerning a subject’s own internal states.
As a further property, a metacognitive system,
when selecting behavior, can represent itself  as
selecting this behavior (“I make the decision”).
Metzinger (2014)  classifies  this  ability  as
third-order  embodiment,  where  the  subject’s
own body is “explicitly represented as existing”
(p. 274) and the “body as a whole” can turn
“into  an  object  of  self-directed  attention”  (p.
275). Thus, metacognition is about monitoring
internal  states  in  order  to  exploit  this  know-
ledge for the control of behavior. According to
Cleeremans (2005), metacognition may also be
used for inferring knowledge about the internal
states of other agents from observing their be-
havior and for communicating a subject’s own
states to others. 
Let us first focus on the individual agent.
What kind of information might be used by a
metacognitive system? A typical case discussed
in the literature concerns some quality measure
of  the  procedure  to  be  selected.  During  de-
cision-making,  a person, when relying on own
knowledge, needs to be able to access his or her
own internal state in order to estimate how sure
he or she is about the specific piece of know-
ledge.  Cleeremans et al. (2007) use as an illus-
trative example a system consisting of two arti-
ficial neural networks. While the first network
learns an input-output mapping of the task, the
other  network,  as  a  second-order  network,
learns to estimate a quality measure describing
the performance of the first-order network. As
the combination of the two networks does not
only store information in the complete system,
but also contains information about and for the
system, the authors conclude that such a sys-
tem already shows a limited form of metacogni-
tion.  Such  a  network,  using  an  additional
second-order subnet, might be implemented in
our system, too. For example, motivation units
could be activated by confidence, or quality val-
ues estimated by such a second-order network.
Such a situation can indeed be found in the net-
work  Navinet.  Navinet  is  used  for  navigation
control tasks and is inspired by work on naviga-
tion in ants. In this system, the salience of a
stored stimulus guides memory retrieval (Cruse
& Wehner 2011;  Hoinville et al. 2012). For in-
stance, the decision to choose one of many dif-
ferent food sources is influenced by the internal
representation  of  the  learned  food  quality
(Hoinville et al. 2012). As another example, the
confidence value of a visual landmark that is to
be followed or not might depend on the salience
of the visual stimulus, similar to the implement-
ation of a Bayesian-like system. A different ex-
ample is given by reaCog, which, by exploiting
its internal body model, is capable of represent-
ing its own body for internal simulation as well
as for control of behavior. Thus, at least some
basic  requirements  for  metacognition,  such  as
being able to use own internal representations
for the control of behavior, are fulfilled, if we,
again, leave the phenomenal aspect aside. Below
we will, in addition, briefly address the ability
of the agent to represent itself.
How may metacognition be suited to sup-
port  information  transfer  between  different
agents? We will not refer to communication us-
ing verbal or gestural symbols here. Instead, we
want to start with the ability to identify oneself
with another agent, or, in other words, to be
able to “step into the shoes of the other.” This
faculty has been referred to as Theory of Mind
(ToM). Central is the notion of being able to
attribute mental states to other agents (Prem-
ack &  Woodruff 1978). A classical example is
the “Sally–Anne task”. In this experiment, two
subjects observe how a cover hides a piece of
candy lying on a table. While one subject, Sally,
is outside of the room, the other subject, Anne,
is  able  to  observe  how  the  hidden  candy  is
moved to a new location. After the change the
candy lies  underneath  a  white  cover  and not
under  the  black  cover,  which  it  did  to  start
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with. The crucial test question is put to Anne:
where does she think Sally will search for the
candy? If Anne points to the white cover she
only uses her own current beliefs about the situ-
ation, but does not apply a ToM, i.e., she does
not take into account what Sally believes—since
Sally has not observed the switch. But if Anne
points to the original location, the black cover,
she is assumed to have a Theory of Mind as she
operates  on  a  set  of  mental  states  that  she
ascribes to Sally.
ToM is  crucial  when an  agent  needs  to
capture not only physical objects, but in addi-
tion represent other agents. It becomes neces-
sary to explicitly keep track of others’ observa-
tions,  plans, and intentions. Only such agents
that can attribute mental states to other agents
can  successfully  predict  their  behavior.  There
are  two  common  explanations  to  account  for
how  ToM  is  realized.  First,  the  so-called
theory–theory (Carruthers 1996)  assumes that
there are dedicated, innate, or learned proced-
ures that allow for prediction of internal states
and therefore the behavior of others. We want
to  concentrate  on  the  second main  approach,
namely simulation theory (Goldman 2005). 
Central to simulation theory is the already
introduced notion of an internal simulation. As
a prerequisite an agent needs an internal model
of him or herself. This model can be used (as
explained)  for  planning  ahead  using  internal
simulation. But in the same way this model can
also be recruited in order to represent another
agent. Thereby,  other agents may be mapped
onto the own internal model that allows simu-
lating the behavior of the other agent. This fac-
ulty would enable the agent to derive all sorts
of conclusions based on its own representations,
such  as,  for  example,  current  goals  or  inten-
tions. 
In the case of reaCog, we envision an ex-
tension  that  allows  mapping  another  agent
onto the already existing internal model.  In-
ternal  simulation  could  be  used  in  this  con-
text,  too.  Therefore,  the  application  of  such
an internal simulation of another agent could
lead  to  an  interpretation  of  the  behavior  of
the  other.  However,  the  two  theories  men-
tioned do not necessarily exclude each other,
as can be shown when regarding the proper-
ties of the cognitive expansion further. If the
interpretation  found  via  an  internal  simula-
tion of another agent is new and succeeds in
simulating  its  behavior,  the  result  could  be
stored in the procedural memory in a similar
way as described for reaCog, when coming up
with  a  new solution  to  a  given  problem.  In
this  way,  a  new procedure has been learned
that allows for  prediction of  the behavior  of
the other agent. As such, application of simu-
lation theory might in the end lead to results
that  are  described  as  characterizing  the-
ory-theory. The faculty of applying a ToM is
currently beyond the ability of reaCog as de-
scribed above, which allows for an egocentric
view only. In the following, we will, however,
sketch a way in which such a network may be
implemented  into  the  architecture  of  reaCog
(for more details see Cruse & Schilling 2011).
Figure  9 shows  a  possible  expansion  of
reaCog.  Two  motivation  units  represent  the
state  “awake”  and  the  state  “sleep”,  respect-
ively. In the awake state, several sensory and/or
motor  elements  can  be  activated.  These  ele-
ments may form different contextual groups. To
simplify  matters,  here  we  focus  on  two  such
groups only. One group contains the procedure
“grasp” and a memory element representing the
visually-given input “position of an object” (rel-
ative to the agent), in this case the position of a
piece of candy (pos.candy), which is hidden un-
der a cover. We further assume that the agent
can also recognize, as a specific kind of object, a
conspecific (“partner”), (see  Steels &  Spranger
2008 and Spranger et al. 2009 for solutions), to
whom the agent can attribute properties. These
are,  in  our  example,  the  memory  elements
“face”  and  “position”,  which  stand  for  the
visual  appearance  and  spatial  location  of  the
partner  to  be  recognized.  Together  with  the
unit “partner” these motivation units form an
excitatory  network  (the  dashed  connections
marked 1A and 1B will be treated later). The
procedure “grasp” contains a body-model con-
sisting of an RNN (Schilling 2011) that contains
information on the arm used for grasping. This
network can be applied to both motor control
and recognition of the arm. The former function
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is symbolized by the output arrow. Concerning
the latter function, the body-model is used to
minimize errors between the position of the in-
ternal model of an arm and the (underspecified)
visual input of the arm (e.g., Schilling 2011). If
the  error  could  be  made  small  enough,  the
visual input can be interpreted so as to match
the morphology and the specific spatial config-
uration  of  the  model  arm.  To  symbolize  this
capability, in figure  9 the procedure “grasp” is
also equipped with sensory (visual) input.
The network depicted in figure  9 (disreg-
arding  connections  1A  and  1B)  enables  the
agent to recognize the position of the candy and
to grasp it (“Ego grasp candy”), as indicated by
the motivation units marked red in figure 9a. It
further allows recognition of the face and the
position of the partner. But it does not enable
the  agent  to  “put  itself  into  the  partner’s
shoes”. In other words, the agent is not able to
realize that the partner may have his/her own
representation of the world. Thus, the capabil-
ity of a ToM is lacking.
The  motivation  unit  connecting  the
agent-related elements “pos.candy” and “grasp”
has been called “Ego” in the figures. Although
not required for the functioning of this network
as shown in figure 9a (disregarding connections
1A and 1B),  the application  of  the  unit  Ego
would allow the introduction of a Word-net rep-
resenting the word “I”. Thus, with this expan-
sion  the  concept  of  “I”,  as  opposed  to  other
agents  (e.g.,  a  partner),  can  be  used  by  our
agent, allowing for internal states like “I grasp
candy”, and therefore for self-representation.
Unit  Ego  is,  however,  necessary  in  our
framework  when  two  units  (here  “Ego”  and
“Partner”) share elements, as will be the case in
the following example, where we will enable the
agent  to  represent  the  partner  performing  a
grasping movement. To this end, we introduce
mutual excitatory connections between the unit
representing the partner and the procedural ele-
ment “grasp” (dashed excitatory connection 1A,
figure  9).  In  addition,  Unit  “Ego”  and  unit
“Partner” have to be connected via mutual in-
hibition (dashed inhibitory connection 1B, fig-
ure 9). This inhibitory connection has the effect
that only one of the units—either unit “Ego” or
unit  “Partner”—can  be  activated  at  a  given
moment in time. With these additional connec-
tions 1A and 1B, the network can adopt the in-
ternal state “Partner grasp candy”. This situ-
ation can be represented in the agent’s memory
by activation of the motivation units illustrated
in figure  9b, highlighted in red. Note that the
introduction of connections 1A and 1B does not
alter the ability of the agent to represent the
situation “Ego grasp candy” addressed above.
The architecture depicted in figure  9, in-
cluding connections 1A and 1B, has eventually
been  termed  the  application  of  “shared
circuits”, since the procedure “grasp” can be ad-
dressed by both unit “Ego” and unit “Partner”,
which strongly reminds us of properties charac-
terizing mirror  neurons.  Therefore,  application
of  such  shared  circuits  has  been  described  as
“mirroring” (Keysers & Gazzola 2007). Units of
the grasp-net (including the target pos.candy)
represent the movement and its goal, and thus
correspond to representations  of  a  motor act,
such as has been attributed to mirror neurons
(Rizzolatti &  Luppino 2001).  The  grasping
movement in both cases (figure 9a, b) is repres-
ented as being viewed by the agent (“Ego grasp
candy”, figure  9a) or by the partner (“Partner
grasp candy”, figure 9b). This means that there
is still no ToM possible for the agent. To enable
the agent to develop a ToM, we need another
expansion. 
To explain this, we will present a simple
simulation  of  the  Sally–Anne  task  mentioned
above. Both protagonists, Sally and Anne, may
have different memory contents concerning the
position  of  the  candy.  This  means  that  the
agent, in this case Anne, needs to be able to
represent  some aspects  of  the  memory of  her
partner,  too.  Therefore,  the  memory  section
representing her partner will be equipped with a
memory  element  representing  the  position  of
the candy as viewed by her partner Sally, who
left  the  room (figure  10,  connection  2).  Both
memory elements that have possible access to
the procedure “grasp” have to be connected by
mutual inhibition, so that only one of these ele-
ments  can  address  the  procedure  at  a  given
time in order to allow for sensible representa-
tion of the situation. Now imagine that the sub-
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ject Anne is either equipped with a network as
depicted in figure  9, or that depicted in figure
10. Application of a system as shown in figure 9
means that the agent (Anne) has only one rep-
resentation of the candy’s position, namely the
one seen last. Therefore only this, correct, posi-
tion can be activated and it is imagined that
the  partner  grasps  the  correct  position—this
kind  of  prediction  is  observed  in  children
younger  than  about  four  years.  Anne  cannot
take  into  account  the  likely  assumption  her
partner  will  make  about  the  location  of  the
candy. In contrast, in a system as presented in
figure  10,  there  is  a  difference  in  thinking  of
oneself grasping the candy or the partner grasp-
ing it. When the agent, Anne, imagines herself
grasping the candy, she would grasp its position
as under the correct cover (figure 10a). If asked
to simulate the internal state of her partner, as
is required in the case of the Sally–Anne test
(figure 10b), the position connected to her part-
ner Sally is used and the agent will rightfully
deduct that her partner’s grasp would be direc-
ted towards this position—which is wrong, but
this fact is not known by her partner. There-
fore, the network shown in figure 10 allows for
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ToM, in contrast to the network shown in fig-
ure 9. The critical difference between both net-
works is that the network shown in figure  10
contains a separate representation of (a part of)
the partner’s memory. This means that a com-
paratively  simple  expansion  of  our  network
shows how the agent  could be equipped with
the ability to apply ToM.
11 Discussion
Consciousness  and the  relation  of  the  outside
world  to mental  representation are central  to
philosophy of mind, and have led to many di-
verse views (Vision 2011). While many of those
views appear plausible in themselves, especially
from a non-philosopher’s perspective, there ap-
pears  to  be  much  disagreement  among philo-
sophers.  Many  of  the  positions  are  based  on
high-level views approaching consciousness in a
top-down  fashion.  In  contrast,  our  approach
starts from a low-level control system for a be-
having agent. The goal is the bottom-up devel-
opment  of  higher-level  faculties.  In  this  way,
the neural  architecture implements a minimal
cognitive system that can be used as a hypo-
thesis for cognitive mechanisms and higher-level
functioning, which are testable in a real-world
system, for example, on a robot. This allows de-
riving testable and quantitative hypotheses for
higher-level  phenomena.  In  this  way,  a  bot-
tom-up approach can nicely complement philo-
sophical  discussions  focusing  mainly  on
higher-level aspects. In addition, such a minimal
cognitive system can provide functional descrip-
tions of  higher-level properties.  We briefly in-
troduced the reaCog system in this article, fol-
lowing  this  bottom-up  approach.  The  central
concern is the emergent properties that can be
identified when analyzing this system. In partic-
ular, high-level properties, such as emotions, at-
tention,  intention,  volition,  or  consciousness
have been considered here and related to the
system.
From our point of view, such a bottom-up
approach leads to a system that can be used to
test quantitative hypotheses. Even though the
system was not intended to model, for example,
consciousness,  the  system  can  be  thoroughly
analyzed  and  emergent  properties  can  be  re-
lated to mental phenomena. This is particularly
interesting, as high-level descriptions can leave
a  lot  of  room for  interpretation.  In  contrast,
connecting mental phenomena to mechanisms of
a well-defined system allows for detailed studies
and clear-cut definitions on a functional level.
In this way, a system can be examined with re-
spect to many even diverging views and may al-
low  resolving  ambiguities.  Knowledge  gained
from analyzing the system can in this way in-
form philosophical theories  and refine existing
definitions by defining sufficient aspects as well
as missing criteria.
One might ask if higher-level phenomena
as considered here are  not  simply too far  re-
moved  for  such  a  simple  system.  One  basic
problem is represented by the frequently-formu-
lated assumption that all these phenomena have
to be tied to the notion of an internal perspect-
ive and that phenomenality has a function in
and of itself. In contrast, we claim that focusing
on the functional aspect is a sensible approach.
It is possible because we believe that the phe-
nomenal  aspect  is  always  coupled  to  specific,
yet unknown, properties of the neuronal system
that, at the same time, have functional effects
and show subjective experience. In other words,
adopting a monist view, we assume that we can
circumvent the “hard” problem, i.e., the ques-
tion concerning the subjective aspect of mental
phenomena, without losing information concern-
ing the function of the underlying procedures.
Of  course,  we are  not  in  a  position to  claim
which of these structures, if any, are accompan-
ied by phenomenality. If, however, the function
of, for example, the artificial system indeed cor-
responds well enough to those of the neuronal
structures that are accompanied by phenomen-
ality, the artificial system may have this prop-
erty, too.
The  control  network  reaCog  consists  of
local  procedural  modules.  We  have  presented
two subnetworks: Walknet, which aims at the
control  of  walking,  and  Navinet,  which  deals
with navigation. Both consist of a heterarchical
structure of motivation units that form a recur-
rent neural network. This, via competition and
cooperation between those units, allows for vari-
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ous  attractor  states  that  enforce  action  selec-
tion. Selection of one or a group of procedures
protects  a  current  behavioral  context  against
non-relevant sensory input. An internal model
of the body is part of the control network co-
ordinating joint movements in walking. As this
model is quite flexible and predictive, it can be
used for planning ahead through internal simu-
lation. Following the definition of McFarland &
Bösser (1993), the network, since it is based on
reactive procedures and is capable of planning
ahead, can be termed a cognitive system, giving
rise to its name: reaCog. In combination with
the  attention  controller,  the  whole  framework
can  come  up  with  new  behavioral  solutions
when  encountering  problems,  i.e.,  behaviors
that are not automatically activated by the cur-
rent  context.  Internal  simulation  allows us to
test these behaviors and to come up with pre-
dicted consequences, which can be used to guide
the selection process for the real system. The
attention controller  cannot  function independ-
ently.  It  is  tightly  connected  to  the  reactive
structures. The procedural memory of the react-
ive system is further accompanied with percep-
tual memory and Word-nets, a specific form of
mixed procedural and perceptual memory. The
latter memory elements allow the introduction
of  symbolic  information.  Symbol-grounding  is
realized by specific connections between the mo-
tivation unit of a Word-net and its partner mo-
tivation  unit,  representing  the  corresponding
concept  in  the procedural  (or  the perceptual)
memory. 
Key characteristics of reaCog are modular-
ity, heterarchy, redundancy, cross-modal influ-
ences (e.g., path integration and landmark nav-
igation  in  Navinet),  bottom-up and top-down
attention control, i.e., the selection of relevant
sensory  inputs,  as  well  as  recruitment  of  in-
ternal models for planning. The complete con-
trol system constitutes a holistic system as the
central selection control process—including the
internal  body-model—is  implemented  as  an
RNN.  Overall,  reaCog  follows  Anderson’s
massive  redeployment  hypothesis  (Anderson
2010), since large parts of the reactive control
network  structure  are  reused  in  higher-level
tasks  (as  discussed  in  detail  in  section  4 for
planning ahead and in section  10.3 for Theory
of Mind). 
ReaCog nicely demonstrates how complex
behavior  can  emerge  from  the  interaction  of
simple control networks and coordination on a
local level, as well as through the loop through
the  environment.  Its  feasibility  is  shown
through the  implementation  of  the  system at
first in dynamic simulation (for Navinet on a
two DoF, wheeled robot platform; for Walknet
using a hexapod, twenty-two DoF hexapod ro-
bot).  Second,  those  control  networks  are cur-
rently  applied  to  a  real  robot,  called  Hector
(Schneider et al. 2011).
Emergent  properties  are  properties  that
are to be addressed using levels of description
other than those used to describe the properties
of the elements. In the reactive part of the sys-
tem (Walknet, Navinet) we have already found
some emergent properties (development of dif-
ferent “gaits”, climbing over large gaps, finding
shortcuts in navigation characterized as cognit-
ive-map-like behavior) as well as forms of bot-
tom-up and top-down attention. With respect
to  the  notion  of  access  consciousness,  several
contributing properties  are  present  in  reaCog.
Most notably, planning ahead through internal
simulation is central to reaCog. New behavioral
plans are tested in the internal simulation, thus
exploiting  the  existing  internal  model  and its
predictive capabilities. Only afterwards are suc-
cessful behaviors applied on the real agent. In
this way, the agent can deal with novel contexts
and is not restricted to the hard-wired structure
of the reactive system.
Furthermore,  the  system  shows  global
availability, which means that elements of the
procedural  memory  can  be  addressed  even  if
they do not belong to the current context. A
third property contributing to elements forming
access consciousness concerns the ability of the
system to communicate with an external super-
visor  by following (i.e.,  understanding)  verbal
commands  and  by  reporting  on  its  internal
states. Therefore, except for the ability of lin-
guistic reasoning, which is clearly missing, the
issues characterizing access consciousness as lis-
ted  by  Cleeremans (2005)  are  fulfilled.  But
there are also disadvantages: (i) First, reactive
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automatic control is faster. As cognitive control
involves internal simulation (and probably mul-
tiple simulations) the whole process takes more
time.  In  addition,  there  is  an  overhead  of
higher-level control going on in contrast to re-
active  control.  (ii)  While  access  consciousness
enables the system to deal with novel situations
and to come up with new behaviors, the same
processes might interfere when they are active
during processing of the reactive control level.
This  might  lead  to  worse  performance  when
both levels are active at the same time. Both
mentioned drawbacks  have  been  confirmed in
psychological  experiments.  We have not  dealt
with the subjective aspect of consciousness. But
leaving this aside, we have shown how reaCog
shows  important  constituent  properties  of  ac-
cess consciousness and how it may provide, in
this way, a scaffold for a more complex system
that  can  manifest  additional  basic  aspects  of
consciousness.
The  property  of  having  an  internal
body-model and the property of being able to
internally  simulate  behavior  have  been  expli-
citly implemented and can therefore not be con-
sidered  emergent  properties  in  our  approach.
However, when referring to a hypothetical evol-
utionary process that may have led to the de-
velopment of  these properties,  the appearance
of  the body-model  and of  cognitive expansion
might well be characterized as representing an
emergent property.
We based our analysis and discussion on
the  perspective  of  Cleeremans,  and  used  his
concepts. One counter argument addressing the
notion of access consciousness is that this no-
tion is too unspecific as it does not help to dis-
tinguish between systems, and may cover “too
many” systems. For instance, one may ask, fol-
lowing a minimalist approach, whether this no-
tion of access consciousness might even include
programs  like  chess-playing  software.  One
might also ask whether there is a fundamental
difference between such a system and a system
like reaCog.
While both systems are able to search for
the solution to a problem using internal simula-
tion, there are indeed crucial differences. A typ-
ical chess program would be not embodied, but,
obviously,  today  this  difference  can  be  easily
overcome and the system could be realized in a
robot equipped with a vision system and a hand
that could move the chess figures.
However, more importantly, the basic dif-
ference between such a chess player and reaCog
would be their flexibility in using internal mod-
els.  A  chess-playing  robot  always  operates
within the same context, which is stored in a
separate memory-domain, for example in a list
of symbolic rules. In contrast, reaCog basically
operates  with a reactive system, but can also
switch to the state of internal simulation when
a problem occurs. It then searches for a solution
by testing memory elements not  belonging to
the actual  context.  In other  words,  reaCog is
able to exchange information between different
contextual domains. Such a switch is not avail-
able to a chess-playing program at all. Such a
program  cannot  distinguish  between  different
contexts. In other words, there is no global ac-
cessibility  in  the  sense  described  for  systems
showing access consciousness. As a consequence,
the discussion of drawbacks connected with ac-
cess  consciousness  as  mentioned in  the  above
paragraph on emergent properties,  that is,  is-
sues (i),  and (ii),  is  not applicable  to such a
chess-playing system, and nor are the dynam-
ical effects observed in the experiments of  Bei-
lock et al. (2002) 1 (section 10.2). 
The same holds for the phenomena of  a
psychological  refractory  period,  attentional
blink,  and the  masking  experiments  discussed
earlier in section  7. None of these phenomena
can be addressed by a classical chess-player sys-
tem, first, because due to the different architec-
tures, no search of a domain belonging to a dif-
ferent context is possible. A chess player does
not meet the requirements of access conscious-
ness as listed by Cleeremans 2005 and represen-
ted  by  reaCog.  Second,  no  specific  dynamics
can be found in such a chess-player system that
could be made responsible for the dynamical ef-
fects mentioned above and which may provide
the substrate for the occurrence of phenomenal
experience. Therefore, both systems are qualit-
atively different. If at all, the chess player may
correspond to a subsection of the symbolic do-
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main of access consciousness, which has not yet
been explicitly addressed in this article.
In  an  earlier  paper  (Cruse &  Schilling
2013), taking a conservative position, we argued
that  properties  of  metacognition  could  not  be
found in the earlier version of reaCog. We have
now provided some new arguments that permit a
different position concerning this matter. Using
this architecture, the agent is able to monitor in-
ternal states and use this information to control
its behavior. Internal states may also be able to
represent the agent itself. A first expansion al-
lows representation of the activations of a part-
ner by using the same procedure as is used for
controlling the agent’s own behavior (application
of “shared” circuits, “mirroring”). Furthermore,
using  an  expansion  proposed  by  Cruse &
Schilling (2011), the agent is also able to exploit
and  represent  knowledge  about  the  internal
states of others, specifically by applying ToM. 
Cruse &  Schilling (2011)  have  further
shown how this  network  can be  expanded to
represent  the  discrimination  between  subject
and object (e.g., Ego push Partner) and to at-
tribute subjective experience (e.g., pain) to the
partner using a shared body-model.  A further
expansion  that  allows  for  mutualism—two
agents  cooperate  to  reach  a  common  goal
(“shared intention”,  Tomasello 2009)—requires
two  body-models,  corresponding  to  what  To-
masello calls a we-model.
In the remainder of this section we briefly
mention some aspects not addressed by reaCog.
First, not all combinations of the elements ex-
plained for our network have been tested within
the  complete  system.  For  example,  Walknet
and Navinet have been tested in separate soft-
ware  and  hardware  simulations.  Second,  we
concentrated on solving motor problems alone,
and did not deal with how this system could
solve problems in the symbolic domain at all.
From an embodied point of view, this restric-
tion is not as problematic as it might initially
seem, as the solution process for many problems
can be traced back to abilities that are based on
solving motor tasks (Glenberg & Gallese 2011);
for example this holds true even for abstract do-
mains  such  as  mathematical  problem-solving
(Lakoff & Nunez 2000).
Finally, an important aspect not addressed
here in any detail concerns how learning of the
memory elements, including the weight of the
motivation unit network, is possible. Examples
of  learning  position  and  quality  of  new  food
sources in Navinet are given by Hoinville et al.
(2012),  examples  of  learning  perceptual  net-
works, including the heterarchical arrangement
of  concepts,  are  given  by  Cruse &  Schilling
(2010a), but introduction of the ability to learn
such properties within the complete system has
not yet been introduced. 
12 Conclusion
We describe  a  way  to  construct  an  artificial
agent whose architecture is characterized by a
number of local, reactive procedures controlled
by an RNN, termed motivation unit network.
This network is able to adopt various attractor
states, or internal states, which are able to pro-
tect  the  complete  system  from  sensory  input
not belonging to the current internal state. No
strict  hierarchy  can  be  observed  in  this  net-
work. Instead, internal states may be represen-
ted by partly overlapping state vectors.
Where  required,  further  procedures  have
been  introduced  that  can  be  interpreted  as
forming explicit representations of parts of the
environment. Specifically, an internal model of
the agent’s own body is introduced that can, as
a “manipulable” body-model, be used for plan-
ning new behaviors via internal simulation. In-
ternal  manipulation  is  possible  because  the
body-model, like a marionette puppet, able to
adopt all configurations the real body can as-
sume. This expansion allows the agent to switch
between reactive control and cognitive control
(in the sense of McFarland & Bösser 1993). 
When  aiming  to  study  higher  mental
properties, at least in human beings, we have to
deal with the phenomenal aspect of these prop-
erties. A number of experimental results suggest
that, i) some, but not all neuronal activities are,
under  specific—and  unknown  in  any  detail—
conditions equipped with a phenomenal aspect,
i.e.,  show  subjective  experience,  but  that  ii)
there is no specific function of this phenomenal
aspect  apart  from  the  functions  that  can  be
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ascribed to the physical properties of the sys-
tem. Note that this does not mean that the phe-
nomenal aspect has no function. Rather, a net-
work  adopts  the  function  only  when,  at  the
same  time,  the  phenomenal  aspect  is  given.
This view allows us to focus the analysis on the
functional aspect of the procedure (see section
7). However, due to our lack of knowledge, as
an external observer we cannot decide whether
a given internal state is a mental state or not (if
mental states are understood as internal states
that are equipped with a phenomenal aspect).
The complete network represents a collec-
tion of hypotheses that can be tested by com-
paring their properties with experimental data
and by trying to match them with theoretical
concepts. Examples studied in this article con-
cern  behaviors  that,  for  an  external  observer,
may be conceptualized as various gait patterns,
or  navigation  using  an  internal  map,  on  the
“lower” level. On a higher level, we deal with
inventing new behaviors and planning ahead, as
well as phenomena attributed to mental states
like emotions, attention, intention, and volition.
Last but not least we compare the properties of
our  approach  with  different  aspects  of  con-
sciousness, such as access consciousness (includ-
ing global accessibility) and metacognition. We
claim that, at least in their basic form, these
phenomena can be attributed to internal states
emerging from the cooperation of decentralized
elements of our network. 
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The “Bottom-Up” Approach to Mental 
Life
A Commentary on Holk Cruse & Malte Schilling
Aaron Gutknecht
With  their  “bottom-up”  approach,  Holk  Cruse  and  Malte  Schilling  present  a
highly intriguing perspective on those mental phenomena that have fascinated hu-
mankind since ancient times. Among them are those aspects of our inner lives that
are at the same time most salient and yet most elusive: we are conscious beings
with complex emotions, thinking and acting in pursuit of various goals. Starting
with, from a biological point of view, very basic abilities, such as the ability to
move and navigate in an unpredictable environment, Cruse & Schilling have de-
veloped, step-by-step, a robotic system with the ability to plan future actions and,
to a limited extent, to verbally report on its own internal states. The authors then
offer  a  compelling  argument  that  their  system  exhibits  aspects  of  various
higher-level mental phenomena such as emotion, attention, intention, volition, and
even consciousness. 
The scientific investigation of the mind is faced with intricate problems at a
very fundamental, methodological level. Not only is there a good deal of concep-
tual vagueness and uncertainty as to what the explananda precisely are, but it is
also unclear what the best strategy might be for addressing the phenomena of in-
terest.  Cruse  &  Schilling’s  bio-robotic  “bottom-up”  approach  is  designed  to
provide answers to such questions. In this commentary, I begin, in the first section,
by presenting the main ideas behind this approach as I understand them. In the
second section, I turn to an examination of its scope and limits. Specifically, I will
suggest a set of constraints on good explanations based on the bottom-up ap-
proach. What criteria do such explanations have to meet in order to be of real sci-
entific value? I maintain that there are essentially three such criteria: biological
plausibility, adequate matching criteria, and transparency. Finally, in the third
section, I offer directions for future research, as Cruse & Schilling’s bottom-up ap-
proach is well suited to provide new insights in the domain of social cognition and
to explain its relation to phenomena such as language, emotion, and self. 
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1 Biorobotics and the bottom-up 
approach to mental life
From my perspective, there are two basic ideas
underlying the overall research strategy enter-
tained by Cruse and Schilling. The first is that
in order to understand a system and its proper-
ties, it has to be reinvented or reconstructed by
the researcher. The second is that mental phe-
nomena may arise  as  emergent properties  via
the interaction of low-level components of a sys-
tem. I’d like to first provide an outline of these
basic ideas and the underlying strategy as I un-
derstand them. In the next section, I will critic-
ally evaluate what types of  questions the ap-
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proach is best suited to answer, and what kind
of problems it will likely face.
The first of the two main ideas is central to
the research area of bio-robotics. If we are able
to create an artificial system that exhibits the
phenomena of interest, we should be a great deal
closer  to  understanding  how these  phenomena
come about in nature. In order for this approach
to lead to valid conclusions, however, the process
of reconstruction has to do justice to the systems
we  are  seeking  to  understand.  In  the  present
context we are concerned, above all,  with hu-
mans and other animals.  This means that the
way  the  artificial  system achieves  the  desired
results has to be biologically plausible, i.e., it has
to be reasonable to assume that the capacities of
the organism that we are trying to understand
are really based on similar mechanisms. In this
vein, Cruse & Schilling (this collection) are real-
ising the basic reactive modules of their system
in form of artificial neural networks that were in-
spired  by  biological  research  on,  for  instance,
stick  insects  (Walknet)  and desert  ants  (Nav-
inet). 
The second of  the basic  ideas derives its
plausibility from an evolutionary perspective on
psychological  faculties.  Emotion,  attention,  the
ability  to  plan  future  actions,  and  any  other
“higher-level” capacities, including consciousness,
did not arise suddenly from one generation to
the next and independently of pre-existing, more
fundamental abilities, such as the ability to con-
trol one’s own body and respond adaptively to
environmental stimuli. Rather these latter abilit-
ies and the interactions between the mechanisms
responsible for them might well have been cru-
cial for mental properties to evolve. From this
perspective, the idea of reconstructing the evolu-
tionary process by starting with basic reactive
structures and examining how through the inter-
action of these structures unexpected properties
might  emerge seems very promising. Since hu-
mans also gradually evolved from simpler organ-
isms, it is natural to assume that the same de-
pendence  between  reactive  structures  and
“higher-level” phenomena is present in our case
as  well.  The  investigation  of  this  dependence
might thus provide new insights into the mech-
anisms underlying human psychology.
But what does it mean exactly to say that
a property emerges from basic structures? What
is an emergent property? The philosophical con-
troversies surrounding the concept of emergence
date back over a hundred years and although
usage of the term has become increasingly pop-
ular in recent years, among both philosophers
and scientist, it can hardly be said to have one
universal definition. Rather, there are numerous
and varied interpretations, a fact which inevit-
ably  leads  to  confusion and misunderstanding
(for  a  good  overview  see  O’Connor &  Wong
2012). It is thus vital to identify precisely what
is meant by emergence in any particular case.
Notwithstanding this inherent ambiguity, there
seems,  however,  to  be  a  shared  idea  behind
much talk  of  emergent  properties:  this  is  the
idea that as systems become increasingly com-
plex  they  tend  to  exhibit  certain  higher-level
properties, which are novel or unexpected given
their simpler, lower-level, components.
Depending  on  how  this  claim  is  inter-
preted it can have more or less serious implica-
tions  regarding  the  fundamental  structure  of
nature, as well as the structure of science. In or-
der to obtain a particularly strong and at the
same time highly influential reading, it must be
understood in a two-fold sense. First, as mean-
ing that these properties cannot  even in prin-
ciple be predicted or explained on the basis of
the  lower-level  properties  of  the  system  and,
second,  as  indicating that  such properties  are
associated  with  genuinely  new  causal  powers,
i.e., they make a real difference to the run of
events and are not mere epiphenomena (for dis-
cussion  see  Kim 1999,  2006).1 This  kind  of
emergence  could  be  called  strong  emergence.2
Central  to  this  conception  is  that  emergent
properties causally influence the simpler entities
from whose organisation they emerge. This sort
of causal influence is called “downward causa-
tion”, as emergent properties are conceived as
1 Such conceptions go back to thinkers such as Samuel Alexander, C.
L. Morgan, and C. D. Broad, prominent figures in a philosophical
movement, which came to be known as “British emergentism”. The
following discussion is, however, intended to illustrate the problem-
atic nature of the concept of emergence and not to offer an analysis
of the ideas of a particular philosophical school. 
2 It should be noted that the there is no universal definition of the
term “strong emergence” in the current literature (for some alternat-
ive characterisations see Chalmers 2006; Bedau 1997; Yates 2013).
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higher-level  properties  arising  from  certain
lower-level  properties  and relations.  Typically,
it is assumed that what we find at the lowest
level of this hierarchy are the properties and re-
lations of fundamental physical particles. Given
this  assumption,  the  existence  of  emergent
properties would entail that a complete descrip-
tion of the fundamental physical organisation of
a system might still leave something out. The
system might  still  have  some  properties  that
could not be predicted on the basis of such a
description and could not be explained in terms
of  the  organisation  of  its  basic  physical  con-
stituents.  Moreover,  because  emergent  proper-
ties  are  causally  efficacious,  knowledge  of  the
basic physical components of a system and their
behaviour may not be sufficient to predict the
future evolution of the system. These considera-
tions seem to lead to the conclusion that the
meta-scientific  thesis,  according  to  which  all
phenomena can ultimately be explained by the
fundamental laws of physics, would turn out to
be false. If certain properties belonging to the
domains  of  psychology,  biology,  or  chemistry
were emergent properties, these could not even
in principle be captured by basic physics alone.
All  sciences  dealing  with  genuinely  emergent
properties  would  remain  completely  autonom-
ous,  positing  their  own independent laws and
explanations.  Furthermore,  since  emergent
properties have the ability to causally influence
lower-level  entities,  the  fundamental  laws  of
physics would not even suffice to explain pro-
cesses taking place at the physical level (see also
Chalmers 2006).
These  are  substantial  conclusions  that
could be met with some scepticism. They are
also one of the reasons for the fierce controversy
surrounding the concept of emergence. Further-
more,  the  condition  that  emergent  properties
are themselves causally efficacious and the gen-
eral  idea  of  “downward  causation”  leads  to
problems in and of itself. This is because there
has  to  be  a  systematic  relationship  between
emergent  and  lower-level  properties,  even
though  they  are  conceived  as  being  distinct
from another. Often this is expressed by saying
that  emergent  properties  are  completely  de-
termined by lower-level properties and require
them for their existence. In other words, if all
lower-level properties of a system are fixed, its
emergent properties are also fixed; and without
any appropriate lower-level properties, a system
cannot have emergent properties. If this weren’t
the  case,  it  would  be  unclear  in  what  sense
emergent  properties  emerge from lower-level
ones (Kim 2006). If their relationship were com-
pletely coincidental, this would surely be an in-
appropriate description. 
Based  on  this  requirement,  Kim (1999,
2006)  has  put  forth  an  influential  argument
that the idea of “downward causation” is unten-
able. In summary, Kim’s basic argument is this:
suppose an emergent property (let’s say a feel-
ing of thirst) causes a lower-level property (e.g.,
a certain activation pattern N in the brain). If
feeling  thirsty  is  an  emergent  property,  there
have  to  be  appropriate  lower-level  properties
from  which  it  emerges.  Let’s  call  these  the
“emergence base” of feeling thirsty. Now, that
feeling thirsty causes N means that there is a
natural law that occurrences of feeling thirsty
are always followed by occurrences of N (feeling
thirsty  is  nomologically  sufficient  for  N).  But
since occurrences of  feeling thirsty are always
accompanied  by  occurrences  of  its  emergence
base, it must also be true that occurrences of its
emergence base are followed by occurrences of
N.  Therefore,  if  feeling  thirsty  causes  N,  its
emergence base also causes N. But this makes
feeling thirsty completely redundant as a cause
of N. Its emergence base is completely sufficient
to explain Ns occurrence, leaving the feeling of
thirst as a mere epiphenomenon. Since this ex-
ample can easily be generalised, one can con-
clude that there are no genuine cases of down-
ward causation and hence no genuine emergent
properties of the type presently under consider-
ation.
In summary, it can be stated that emer-
gence  is  a  highly  controversial  concept—not
only because of its inherent ambiguity, but also
on account of certain varieties of emergentism
that  have  substantial  metaphysical  and
meta-scientific implications as well as a commit-
ment  to  the  problematic  idea  of  downward
causation. The crucial questions remaining now
are whether  Cruse &  Schilling (this collection)
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provide a clear interpretation of the concept of
emergence and whether it provokes the kind of
controversy and criticism outlined above. What
kind  of  emergence  is  involved  in  their  claim
that mental states might be construed as emer-
gent  properties?  In  fact,  they  provide  two
slightly different characterisations. According to
the first, an emergent property is to be under-
stood as a property of a whole system that can-
not, at first sight, be traced back to the interac-
tions of the systems components. Alternatively,
one might say that  we cannot, at  first  sight,
predict  the  emergent  properties  of  a  complex
system based on our knowledge of its parts and
their interaction. Thus, we might be genuinely
surprised that the system in question exhibits
such  properties.  Emergence  in  this  sense  is
sometimes  called  weak  emergence  (Chalmers
2006). If this is all that it means for a system to
have emergent properties, few would raise seri-
ous objections. This sort of emergence is just a
consequence of our limited knowledge and cog-
nitive capacities and is relative to the judging
subject:  what  might  not  be  immediately  pre-
dictable for one person might be just so for an-
other.  Emergentism,  in  this  sense,  has  no
far-reaching metaphysical or meta-scientific im-
plications and is not committed to any sort of
“downward causation”.
Cruse & Schilling (this collection) provide
a second, and equally unproblematic, definition
of emergence that is specifically tailored for ap-
plication in the context of robotics. According
to that definition, a property of an artificially
constructed system is emergent if it was not ex-
plicitly implemented by its designers. We might
call this  implementational emergence. This ap-
pears to be relatively independent of the sort of
“weak” emergence I’ve just described. Even a
property  not  explicitly  implemented  might  be
predictable without too much effort, whereas a
property deliberately implemented might not be
predictable, at least by persons lacking experi-
ence or competence. I think that most of  the
emergent properties Cruse & Schilling (this col-
lection)  attribute  to  their  artificial  system,
reaCog,  match  both  characterisations:  they
were neither explicitly implemented nor would
we immediately expect or predict that reaCog
would  exhibit  them.  At  the  same  time,  the
properties in question are highly interesting and
are not simply insignificant side effects. This is
important  since,  according  to  the  definitions
provided by Cruse & Schilling, the claim that
an artificial system exhibits emergent properties
is, in and of itself, not particularly notable. But
this  depends  entirely  on  what  the  emergent
properties in question precisely are. The finding
that  reaCog  exhibits,  in  this  way,  aspects  of
psychological characteristics, such as emotion or
attention and the ability to perform non-trivial
body movements, are most certainly of consid-
erable scientific significance. In conclusion, we
may say that although the kind of emergentism
advocated by Cruse & Schilling does not have
the same far-reaching implications as the partic-
ularly demanding conception outlined above, it
is nonetheless useful and philosophically inter-
esting. This is because it functions as the basis
of an intriguing approach to the study of psy-
chological properties, which I shill now endeav-
our to describe.
Combining the idea of emergence with the
idea,  outlined  above,  that  in  order  to  under-
stand a system and its properties, it has to be
reinvented or reconstructed, we arrive at a fas-
cinating research strategy. The first step con-
sists in observing the behaviour of animals that,
although lacking many of the sophisticated abil-
ities with which humans are endowed, are non-
etheless  capable  of  flexibly  controlling  their
bodies in order to cope with an unpredictable
environment (such as stick insects, desert ants,
and honey bees).  Based on these observations
one then develops a neural network model (e.g.,
Walknet  or  Navinet)  designed to produce the
behaviour observed in the first step. Next, this
model is realised in an artificial system (either
virtual or robotic) in order to examine to what
extent  the  behaviour  produced  by  the  model
matches the behaviour of the biological organ-
ism on which it is based. If it resembles it to a
great extent, this can be taken as  prima facie
evidence  that  the  mechanisms  underlying  the
behaviour are the same for the animal and the
robot. Different modules that are constructed in
this way are then integrated into a holistic sys-
tem.  Further  modules  might  be  added
Gutknecht, A. (2015). The “Bottom-Up” Approach to Mental Life - A Commentary on Holk Cruse & Malte Schilling.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 9(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570474 4 | 10
www.open-mind.net
step-by-step (e.g., Body Model, Attention-Con-
troller,  Word-Nets).  The  result  is  a  complex
system (in the present case “reaCog”) the beha-
viour and properties of which cannot be easily
predicted even by its very own designers. The
last,  and most  important  step  consists  of  ex-
amining whether the system shows characterist-
ics that were not explicitly implemented but in-
stead arise from the dynamic interactions of the
system’s components. The most intriguing ques-
tion in this context is, of course, whether the fi-
nal system shows aspects of those phenomena
that are constitutive of having a mind.
Although this is only a rough sketch of the
methodology entertained by  Cruse &  Schilling
(this collection), I hope I have captured the es-
sential  points  sufficiently  to  proceed  with  an
evaluation of  its scope and the possible prob-
lems it might face. What kind of questions is
the bottom-up approach best suited to answer?
Which  phenomena  or  processes  can  be  ad-
dressed  by  research  based  on  this  approach?
What considerations have to be taken into ac-
count  in  order  for  the  presented  research
strategy to be successful? Are there any general
constraints bio-robotic bottom-up explanations
have to meet? As we shall see, the answers to
these last two question are directly connected to
two characteristics of the research strategy out-
lined in the previous paragraph: first, that it in-
volves, at two points, a comparison of the beha-
viour  of  significantly  different  systems  and,
second,  that  it  is  specifically  designed to dis-
cover emergent properties.
2 The bottom-up approach: Objectives, 
benefits and constraints
2.1 Mechanisms and the evolution of the 
mind 
The most important aspect of the proposed ap-
proach is that it helps to elucidate the mechan-
isms underlying various mental properties. This
is possible because many of the basic features of
the control system reaCog are known. Using the
words of  Cruse &  Schilling (this collection), it
constitutes  a  “quantitatively  defined  system”.
As  all  components  are  realised  as  artificial
neural networks, all information about the num-
ber of neurons, the connection weights between
them, and the way individual neurons process
information  is  available.  More  importantly,
however, the basic functional architecture of the
system is well understood. Which modules are
connected in which ways to other modules, how
they receive their input, and what other parts
of the system might be affected by their out-
puts  does  not  have  to  be  figured  out  by
painstaking investigation—as is the case in bio-
logical  research.  Because  these  facts  about
reaCog are known, it is possible to provide de-
tailed  mechanism  descriptions.  In  this  way,
reaCog’s ability to plan its future actions by in-
ternal simulation can be explained by reference
to the interaction of its various sub-modules: a
problem detector is activated when sensory in-
put indicates that current behaviour will lead, if
continued,  to  adverse  effects  for  the  system
(e.g., falling over). This leads to the abortion of
current behaviour and activation in the Spread-
ing  Activation  Layer,  which  randomly excites
the  Winner-Takes-All  network  (WTA-net).
After some time, the WTA-net adopts a relaxed
state in which only one of its units is active.
This active unit in turn stimulates its counter-
part in the Motivation Unit Network, leading to
activity  of  the  corresponding  reactive  proced-
ures. These provide motor output that can be
redirected to the body model, which then simu-
lates the execution of  the proposed behaviour
and predicts its likely consequences. If the sys-
tem predicts that the problem will persist, the
process  of  internal  simulation goes on until  a
solution is  found,  which  can then be used to
control the actual movements of the system. 
Explanations like these contain a lot of in-
formation about which functional subparts of a
system are engaged during the exercise of the
ability  in  question.  In  this  particular  case  it
makes clear how the ability to plan ahead, a
cognitive ability,  depends heavily on basic re-
active  structures  that  are  designed to  control
specific  leg  movements  as  well  as  an internal
model of the body. The same is true for various
other  capacities  like  attention  and  Theory  of
Mind. Thus, new insights into the mechanisms
responsible  for  those  phenomena  in  humans
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could be gained by considering how body mod-
els and motor control mechanisms are realised
in our case and how these systems interact. In
other words, the bottom-up approach may lead
to new directions for future research concerning
human psychology  by suggesting  how specific
functional  modules  interact  in  order  to  bring
about a particular target phenomenon. Whether
this approach is tenable depends on the degree
to which findings pertaining to the artificial sys-
tem might legitimately be used to draw conclu-
sions  about  human  beings.  I  will  propose  a
number of constraints to ensure that this condi-
tion is fulfilled below.
Another  class  of  questions  that  a  bot-
tom-up strategy is well designed to answer has
to do with the evolution of cognitive capacities:
how did cognitive systems evolve from purely re-
active systems? How did emotions, attention, or
even consciousness arise? What are the natural
precursors  of  these  phenomena?  Cruse &
Schilling (this collection) show convincingly that
no completely new neural modules are needed in
order for such properties to occur. Rather, minor
changes in the basic architecture might suffice to
generate radical extensions of the abilities of a
system. In this way, a reactive system with a
body model can acquire the ability to plan ahead
if it is able to disconnect its motor system from
the physical body and instead send the motor
signals  to  its  internal  body  model.  No  novel
“planning module”  is  needed.  Already existing
modules just have to become dissociable and can
thus acquire new functions (Cruse 2003). In ad-
dition, the target paper suggests an answer to
the question of the evolutionary function of cog-
nition understood as the ability to plan ahead: it
was the necessity of being able to control a com-
plex body in a complex environment that made
this ability highly valuable. Detecting problems
by perception, finding innovative solutions by in-
ternal simulation and acting on them are capa-
cities that are extremely advantageous for any
organism possessing a body with a high number
of  redundant  degrees  of  freedom  (see  Cruse
2003). This is in line with, and actually extends,
the widespread assumption that the evolutionary
function  of  cognition  is  to  deal  with  environ-
mental complexity (Godfrey-Smith 2002).
2.2 Constraints on bio-robotic bottom-up 
explanations
In  the  previous  paragraph  we  saw  that  the
framework  Cruse &  Schilling (this collection)
present  is  well-equipped  to  give  new  insights
into the underlying mechanisms of psychological
phenomena and the evolution of  cognition, as
well as a promising approach to creating highly
flexible and intelligent robots. There are, how-
ever, some problems the proposed strategy has
to face, especially if the control structures be-
come increasingly complex. I therefore want to
suggest a set of three constraints on good bot-
tom-up explanations of biological/psychological
phenomena.
1. Adequate matching criteria:3 At two points
the research strategy described in section 1
involves a comparison between the behaviour
of an artificial system on the one hand and a
biological system on the other. First, this is
the case in the development of  neural  net-
work  models  of  animal  behaviour.  In  this
context, the comparison is used to ascertain
whether the proposed model of the mechan-
isms underlying certain capacities (e.g., walk-
ing) really reproduces the original behaviour
of the animal (e.g., a stick insect). Second,
there is a similar process of comparison in-
volved  in  the  application  of  psychological
concepts to the complete system. At different
points in their discussion,  Cruse &  Schilling
(this collection) argue that their system has
certain mental capacities because it exhibits
behaviour (or would exhibit it if certain ex-
tensions  were  implemented)  connected  to
those  mental  capacities  in  humans.  So,  for
example, just as the performance of athletes
might  worsen if  they consciously  attend to
what they are doing, the activation of the at-
tention  controller  in  reaCog  can  lead  to
poorer results compared to unimpeded execu-
tion of the reactive procedures.
Both processes of comparison require criteria
to identify when the behaviour of the artifi-
cial system and that of the biological system
3 I credit this term to Datteri & Tamburrini 2007.
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are relevantly similar, i.e., similar enough in
order to provide evidence for the claim that
similar mechanisms are at work in both cases
or that the artificial  system and the biolo-
gical system share certain psychological char-
acteristics (Datteri & Tamburrini 2007). The
difficulty of finding such criteria increases the
more the bodies of the compared systems dif-
fer. In some cases they might nonetheless be
easy  to  find  and relatively  uncontroversial.
This, however, is not always the case. For in-
stance, in their discussion of emotions—and
more specifically the emotion of happiness—,
Cruse &  Schilling (this collection)  suggest
that by increasing the threshold of the prob-
lem detector reaCog would take more risks,
thus behaving similarly to humans when they
are happy. Now, the question is whether the
kind of risky behaviour exhibited by reaCog
when the threshold of its problem detector is
increased is the same kind of risky behaviour
humans exhibit when they are happy. Only if
this condition is fulfilled can the similarity be
taken as evidence that reaCog shows aspects
of the emotion of happiness. 
2. Biological plausibility: Any proposed mechan-
ism should be  biologically  plausible,  i.e.,  it
has to be reasonable to assume that the ca-
pacities of the organism that we are trying to
understand are really based on such a mech-
anism. This can, at least to some degree, be
ensured  by  trying  to  create  similarities
between the artificial and the biological or-
ganism on  a  basic  structural  level,  for  ex-
ample  by  using  artificial  neural  networks.
Furthermore,  it  is  necessary to decide  how
fine-grained the model should be. Should the
model take brain structures, neurons, or sub-
cellular elements as its basic building blocks?
Should intracellular processes be neglected or
are  they  important?  The  answer  will  of
course  always  be  relative  to  our  particular
epistemic  goals.  Finally,  there  are  different
options regarding the way artificial neurons
process information, i.e., how they calculate
their  output  value  depending  on  the
weighted  sum  of  their  inputs.  All  these
factors might turn out to be important if the
results  are  to  be  used  to  infer  biological
mechanisms.
The  requirement  of  biological  plausibility
shouldn’t,  however,  be  overemphasised.
Cruse & Schilling (this collection) stress that
they  are  not  trying  to  present  a  realistic
model  of  neuronal  activity  in  living  organ-
isms. Hence, they are using biologically im-
plausible,  non-spiking  artificial  neurons  as
the basic elements of their architecture, while
noting that some authors (referring to Singer
1995) have located the neural basis of con-
sciousness in synchronously oscillating spikes.
This, however, is not a weighty objection to
the proposed approach since it is designed as
a  functional approach. The question is: how
do different functional subsystems like a sys-
tem for controlling the swing-movement of a
leg, a system modelling the robot’s body, and
a system allowing for the selection of differ-
ent internal states interact in order to pro-
duce  certain  emergent  phenomena?  There-
fore, the concrete physical realisation of these
subsystems is of only secondary importance.
3. Transparency:4 Doubts about the strategy of
using  artificial  systems  in  order  to  under-
stand biological systems arise because even if
we were to create an extremely intelligent ro-
bot, it would not necessarily help us to un-
derstand the mechanisms underlying its intel-
ligence. Rather, we might be faced with yet
another complex system whose workings we
do  not  understand  (Holland &  Goodman
2003). Now, the approach Cruse & Schilling
(this collection)  present  is  specifically  de-
signed to discover emergent properties,  i.e.,
properties that were not explicitly implemen-
ted. This means that there will be a high risk
of finding properties in the complete system
that  cannot  be  readily  provided  with  a
clear-cut  mechanistic  explanation  involving
the cooperation of the system’s components.
Although the explanations of the occurrence
of various psychological properties presented
4 The concept of transparency has a number of other well-established
interpretations in the literature that should not be confused with the
one at issue in the present context. These include, for example, “se-
mantic” (Clark 1989) and “phenomenal” (Metzinger 2004) transpar-
ency.
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in the present paper are quite convincing, the
bottom-up strategy might eventually exhaust
its potential if the complexity of the system
is further increased. 
3 Future perspectives: The social insect
I would like to conclude by briefly proposing a
perspective for future research based on the sys-
tem reaCog. As presented, its ability to interact
and cooperate with other agents is fairly restric-
ted. At the same time, the pre-requisites of a
broader social extension of the system seem to
be in place.  The present paper already shows
how reaCog could be equipped with the capacit-
ies to recognize the behaviour of others and ap-
ply  a  Theory  of  Mind.  In  their  2011 paper,
Cruse &  Schilling further propose that by im-
plementing a two-body model (a “We-model”)
reaCog might be capable of cooperative beha-
viour using shared goals.  Integration and fur-
ther  expansion  of  such  social  capacities,  and
their  application  in  an  actual  robot,  seems
promising considering the importance of social
interaction in processes such as language acquis-
ition and emotional regulation. Some have even
suggested that the presence of other agents in
the  environment,  or,  in  other  words,  dealing
with social complexity, was a dominant factor
in the evolution of sophisticated cognitive abilit-
ies (Humphrey 1976). Thus bio-robotic research
in this direction might provide new insights into
the mechanisms underlying such developmental
and evolutionary processes. Moreover, a social
extension of reaCog might eventually shed light
on potential emergent phenomena  on a group
level,  such  as  labour  division,  collective  plan-
ning,  social  hierarchies  and,  most  fundament-
ally, joint action coordination. What high-level
social phenomena emerge when multiple bio-ro-
botic  systems  like  reaCog  interact  with  each
other?
Cruse and Schilling’s system seems partic-
ularly  well-suited  to  further  illuminate  motor
theories of social cognition. According to such
theories, the important social cognitive capacity
of  understanding  another’s  actions  is  directly
linked to mechanisms that are active when the
observer performs similar actions  Gallese et al.
2004; for criticism see Jacob & Jeannerod 2005).
The underlying neural mechanism has come to
be known as the mirror-neuron system. Further-
more, there is evidence that the mirror-neuron
system  plays  a  role  in  certain  aspects  of
self-consciousness.  For  instance,  Uddin  (2007;
see also Molnar-Szakacs & Uddin 2013) suggests
that this is the case for representations of the
physical  self,  and  ascribes  frontoparietal  mir-
ror-neuron  areas  an  important  function  for
self-recognition  (especially  the  recognition  of
one’s own face). As mirroring mechanisms can
be integrated in reaCog as well, this opens the
possibility of further investigating motor theor-
ies of social cognition and the relation between
internal  motor  simulation  and  the  self  in  a
quantitatively defined system. 
An ability that is highly important for hu-
man social interaction is the ability to commu-
nicate  using  language.  At  this  point,  the  lin-
guistic capacities of reaCog still seem quite in-
flexible and limited in scope. A highly interest-
ing extension of this system would be to provide
it  with  the  means  to  learn  words  and  their
meanings  by  interaction  with  other  agents.
Some of the pre-requisites, like the ability to in-
ternally simulate the behaviour of others, could,
as Cruse and Schilling argue, be implemented in
reaCog by using its internal body-model to rep-
resent another agent. Robotic research in this
direction was performed by  Steels &  Spranger
(2009).  Their  artificial  systems are capable of
autonomously acquiring a simple language con-
sisting of words for specific body postures. After
learning  is  complete,  the  artificial  agents  are
able to reliably assume body postures on verbal
command by other agents. Since social learning
has  also  been  implicated  in  the  process  of
concept  formation (Steels 2002),  the proposed
extension might also foster our understanding of
this intriguing phenomenon. 
4 Conclusion
In  conclusion  it  can  be  stated  that  Cruse &
Schilling (this collection) present a highly fas-
cinating  research  strategy  that  is  well  worth
pursuing. The bottom-up approach can provide
us with new insights  regarding the functional
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mechanisms  underlying  psychological  phenom-
ena and their evolution. Although the notion of
emergence  is  central  to  it,  Cruse &  Schilling
(this collection) avoid the philosophical contro-
versies surrounding this concept by interpreting
it in a less demanding, yet interesting and use-
ful way. There are, however, a number of con-
straints  that  explanations  based  on  the  bot-
tom-up  approach  have  to  meet.  First,  since
Cruse & Schilling’s (this collection) strategy in-
volves,  at  two  points,  a  comparison  between
markedly different systems, criteria are needed
according to which we can determine whether
the two systems exhibit relevantly similar beha-
viour. Second, the structural architecture of the
artificial system must have an adequate degree
of biological plausibility. And finally, it has to
be ensured that increasing the complexity of the
system does not lead to the practical impossibil-
ity of elucidating the mechanisms underlying its
emergent properties. 
A promising next step for bottom-up re-
search as presented by  Cruse &  Schilling (this
collection) would be to take it to the level of so-
cial interaction. An extensive social extension of
their system could shed light on a wide range of
intriguing phenomena. Is it possible to discover
emergent properties on a group level? In what
precise way are mirroring mechanisms involved
in social cognition? What role do such mechan-
isms play for the phenomenon of self-conscious-
ness? What role do reactive structures and in-
ternal body-models play in the processes of lan-
guage acquisition and comprehension? Of course
this is  only a small  selection of  the questions
further bio-robotic research might contribute to
answering.  Cruse &  Schilling (this collection)
made clear that starting from the bottom is a
strategy  with  enormous  scientific  significance.
There is no doubt that this work will make an
important contribution to a plethora of research
projects in the future.
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The Bottom-up Approach: Benefits and 
Limits
A Reply to Aaron Gutknecht
Holk Cruse & Malte Schilling
Aaron Gutknecht supports our bottom-up approach, specifies possible limits and
highlights interesting future aspects. His added perspective is valuable and inter-
esting to us. As we fully agree with his view, we only add some complementary
remarks.
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We appreciate  the  comments  given  by  Aaron
Gutknecht very much, in particular his discussion
and clarification of the term “emergence” and its
philosophical  background.  This  discussion  com-
prises a sensible completion of our article going
beyond the scope of our expertise. In this context,
Aaron Gutknecht correctly states that our way of
using the term “emergence” may cover two as-
pects, one called “weak emergence”, the other he
addressed as “implementational emergence”. We
have – possibly forming some kind of common de-
nominator - a third characterization in mind, one
that  covers  different  description  levels:  a  phe-
nomenon is considered emergent if it turns out
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that known properties of the network could also
be characterized on a different level of description
than the  one  currently  used.  On this  different
level the phenomenon conceptually constitutes a
term or definition. If we, for example, describe the
structure and function of reaCog on the neuronal
level, we may realize at some point that there are
behavioral aspects which could, by an outside ob-
server,  be characterized by a term that is  not
defined at a neuronal level of description, such as,
for example, “intention”. 
2 The bottom-up approach
This way of using the term emergence is directly
related to the bottom-up approach applied here.
This  approach  is  inspired  by  Feynman,  who
stated that we understand a system only when we
are able to construct it (in  Hawking 2001) and
may be even dated back to  Giambattista Vico
(1710).  The  bottom-up  approach  allows  us  to
study the extent to which linguistic concepts pro-
posed in the literature may correspond to proper-
ties realized by our artificial system. If one was
not  prepared  to  accept  that  a  specific  concept
would correspond to selected properties of the ar-
tificial  system,  either  the  linguistic  concepts
might  be  adapted  accordingly,  or  the  artificial
system might be judged as to show deficits. The
latter case could then give rise to adapt the cur-
rent simulation model to better match the verbal
proposal given. This capability of the bottom-up
approach led  Manuela Lenzen (2014) to charac-
terize reaCog as a “concept clarifying machine”
(“Begriffspräzisierungsmaschine”).
3 Possible limits of the bottom-up 
approach
Aaron Gutknecht further proposes a well-chosen
list of issues that should be taken into account
when  following  a  bottom-up  approach  as  pro-
posed here, namely “adequate matching criteria”,
“biological plausibility” and “transparency”. 
Concerning the first issue, “adequate match-
ing criteria”,  Aaron Gutknecht addresses a pos-
sibly critical point. In section 8 (Emotions), we
characterize happiness by the property that risky
decisions are made more probable. We admit that
our example is formulated in a sketchy way, only
addressing one basic aspect for illustration. There
are, however, more deeply founded examples that
have been briefly referred to in the main text and
will be explained in more detail here. Two recent
studies, one in crayfish, the other in the fruitfly,
provide strong hints that emotion-like states can
be found in simple organisms as arthropods or,
more  specifically  in  the  latter-case,  insects.  In
crayfish,  Fossat et al. (2014) have convincingly
shown that context-independent, anxiety-like be-
havior can be induced by experimentally applied
stress or by application of serotonin. Both meth-
ods lead the animals to avoid illuminated sections
of their environment which they are normally in-
terested to explore. Anxiety is related to fear but
considered a secondary emotion that occurs after
the stressing signal  has disappeared.  Thus,  the
probability of selecting specific behaviors, in this
case  exploration  of  illuminated  places,  is  de-
creased. This avoidance behavior could be abol-
ished after application of drugs that are known to
have anxiolytic effects in mammals. Applied to
reaCog, these results could be interpreted in the
following way. Emotion-like states would not only
influence the global WTA net, but also thresholds
of local, lower level WTA networks that are re-
sponsible for switching between different proced-
ures.
Another interesting case has been reported
by Yang et al. (2014) in Drosophila. These anim-
als learnt that various behaviours selected in try-
ing to avoid a problem, in this case escape from a
heated  ground,  were  not  successful.  As  a  con-
sequence, they ended up in a state of passivity.
This result has been discussed as an example of
“learned helplessness”, which is considered an an-
imal model of depression. In our framework, this
could simply be realized by freezing activity in
the  Spreading  Activation  Layer  network  that
provides input to the WTA net (section 4).
Concerning  the  second  issue,  “biological
plausibility”, we fully support Gutknecht’s per-
spective and have only a minor aside. Applica-
tion  of  non-spiking  neurons  is  not  necessarily
biologically  implausible.  Rather,  non-spiking
neurons do exist in invertebrate and in verteb-
rate  brains.  They  play  important  functional
roles, but are generally less well-known, mainly
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because investigating them involves methodolo-
gical  problems  that  are  more  difficult  than
those  of  spiking  neurons.  The  third  issue,
“transparency”,  addresses  the  view  that  the
bottom-up strategy may eventually exhaust its
potential when the complexity of the system is
further  increased.  Although  we  agree  with
Gutknecht here, we would like to add that the
bottom-up approach still  bears  the  advantage
that, as the details of such a system are known,
its  properties  can  be  thoroughly  analyzed  by
physical  and/or  mathematical  methods.  This
ability, of course, does not guarantee that one
will  find answers in such a hypothetical  case,
but there are various methods available to ad-
dress such questions. Further, we believe that
the problem of  lacking transparency may not
happen to occur too often. This belief is suppor-
ted by the observation that already our simple
system, reaCog, appears to be able to reach in-
tegration levels characterized by terms such as
intention, volition and consciousness. 
4 What should be done next?
Aaron Gutknecht closes his comments by con-
sidering future aspects. Again, we agree with his
recommendations and have, partly, indeed star-
ted with two of the aspects addressed. We ap-
plied the internal model in a cooperative scen-
ario in which the visual impression of another
agent performing an action was mapped onto
the system’s own internal body model. In this
way the internal model was driven by the visual
input  and the  internal  model  reenacted  what
the other agent was doing. This mapping allows
one to connect the experiences of somebody else
to one’s own action repertoire as one steps into
the shoes of the other (Schilling 2011; see also
Gallese &  Cuccio this collection).  Second,  as
mentioned in the main text, shared circuits are
required for an agent to represent the action of
a partner (Cruse & Schilling this collection, fig-
ure 9). In order to allow for ToM, an additional
separate representation of the partner’s memory
is required (figure 10). To be able to apply a su-
permodel  (or  we-model,  Tomasello 2009),  a
more complex model is required (see  Cruse &
Schilling 2011, figure 6).
5 Conclusion
The bottom-up approach advocated here to un-
derstand  higher-level  phenomena  may  be  con-
sidered a non-Platonic approach that aims to con-
struct artificial, but strongly biologically inspired
systems. These systems should be able to simu-
late complex behavioral tasks, but do so by ap-
plication  of  simple  elements,  artificial  neurons,
and a simple decentralized neuronal architecture.
If successful one could then study whether more
abstract  concepts  introduced  in  psychology  or
philosophy, for example, could sensibly be applied
to such a system. We claim to have shown an ex-
ample supporting this approach.
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Why and How Does Consciousness 
Seem the Way it Seems?
Daniel C. Dennett
Are-expression of some of the troublesome features of my oft-caricatured theory of
consciousness, with new emphases, brings out the strengths of the view and shows
how it  comports with and anticipates the recent introduction of  Bayesian ap-
proaches to cognitive science. 
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People are often baffled by my theory of con-
sciousness, which seems to them to be summed
up  neatly  in  the  paradoxical  claim  that  con-
sciousness  is  an  illusion.  How could  that  be?
Whose  illusion?  And  would  it  not  be  a  con-
scious illusion? What a hopeless view! In a bet-
ter world, the principle of charity would set in
and  they  would  realise  that  I  probably  had
something rather less daft in mind, but life is
short, and we’ll have one less difficult and coun-
terintuitive  theory  to  worry  about  if  we  just
dismiss  Dennett’s  as  the  swiftly  self-refuting
claim that  consciousness  is  an  illusion.  Other
theorists,  including,  notably,  Nicholas
Humphrey (2006,  2011),  Thomas Metzinger
(2003, 2009) and Jesse Prinz (2012), know bet-
ter, and offer theories that share important fea-
tures with mine. I toyed with the idea of trying
to re-offer my theory in terms that would signal
the areas of agreement and disagreement with
these welcome allies, but again, life is short, and
I have found that task simply too much hard
work.  So with apologies,  I’m going to restate
my position with a few new—or at least newly
emphasized—wrinkles,  and  let  them  tell  us
where we agree and disagree. 
I take one of the usefully wrong landmarks
in current  thinking about consciousness  to be
Ned  Block’s  attempt  to  distinguish  “phenom-
enal consciousness” from “access consciousness.”
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